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Since its inception in 1992, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) has taken
thousands of decisions to implement its three objectives related to the conservation
and sustainable use of biodiversity, and the equitable sharing of the benefits of
biodiversity use. But progress toward these goals is halting, most expressly in Parties’
failures to meet the Aichi Biodiversity Targets.2 Crucial Articles of the CBD, such as
10(c), which states that Parties should integrate conservation and sustainable use
into national decision-making, encourage customary use of biological resources,
and support local populations to develop and implement restoration of degraded
areas, remain woefully underdeveloped. These shortcomings are evident in the
accelerating rate of biodiversity loss documented in the 2019 IPBES
(Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services)
Global Assessment, which demonstrated “good progress” on only four out of 20 of
the Aichi targets and estimated that current trends in loss of biodiversity and
ecosystem services would undermine progress on 80% of the Sustainable
Development Goals.3 That report also acknowledged the need for “transformative
change” in addressing the ongoing biodiversity crisis. Ideally, the post-2020 global
biodiversity framework negotiations will conclude with decisions and plans that
can address these failures. But doing so means reckoning with what’s gone wrong,
including with financial resources.
In explaining the lack of progress, reports on biodiversity finance from states,
bankers, and conservation organisations often point to a large funding gap. That is,
they explain ongoing biodiversity loss by gesturing to the disjuncture between the
current financial resources and the resources needed to implement CBD objectives
and decisions. These gaps exist, but are almost always presented without context,
as though the problem will be resolved through increased funds alone. In this report,
we explicitly go beyond the simplistic call for increased finance, foregrounding the
need for political and economic restructuring capable of addressing underlying
drivers of biodiversity loss: dramatic changes in trade and investment rules, a
concerted effort to understand and address the role of debt and austerity, and
policy options that recognise inequality across racialised, gender, class, caste and
colonial lines as not only an outcome of, but also a driver of, extractivism, and thus
also an underlying driver of ongoing biodiversity loss.
2 Buchanan et al., 2020.
3 United Nations, 2019b.
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There is no doubt that more financial resources are necessary. And there is no
doubt that rich governments have failed to live up to commitments made in Rio to
“common but differentiated responsibilities” (CBDR). Not only do bi- and multilateral
flows of biodiversity finance fall short of Article 20 of the CBD on financial resources,
but there is the large, growing and unpaid, often unrecognised, ecological debt of
both wealthy states and individuals – a debt accrued through hundreds of years of
extractive economic development whose costs too often fall upon racialised people,
Indigenous Peoples, smallholder farmers, fisherpeople and women. The term used
to describe this kind of development is extractivism, which refers to “the industries,
actors and financial flows, as well as the economic, material and social processes
and outputs, associated with the globalized extraction of natural resources”,
including all of the industries most implicated in global biodiversity declines – mineral
and fossil fuel extraction, monocultural large-scale agricultural, forestry, and fisheries
operations.4 As scholars of global political economy describe, extractivism is a kind
of development that disproportionately benefits nations, transnational corporations,
and consumers in the developed countries5, or the wealthy in the developing
countries.6 The relations of extractivism, we suggest, extend also to inequitable
sharing of the benefits arising from the utilisation of genetic resources, also known
as biopiracy. Part 1 of this report reviews these growing ecological debts, failures to
live up to obligations on CBDR, and outlines some challenges of the primary financial
mechanism of the CBD – the Global Environment Facility (GEF).
Financial shortfall – the gap between the financial support required and what
is available – is not the only limit to CBD implementation, however. Being able to
both assess and remedy this lack of resources requires understanding the broader
political and economic forces that drive biodiversity loss and shape decision-making
by Parties. In light of global climate change, biodiversity loss, and the wealth/health
inequalities brought into greater focus by COVID-19, we are living in a moment of a
great “re-think” about international and national political economic structures and
norms. This document synthesises a wide array of research and analysis that we
hope will contribute to this reconsideration of the pervasive assumptions and
narratives about finance and biodiversity in an era of ongoing extractivism. This
demands that we focus not only on how we can funnel private or public investment
into conservation and sustainable use, but also on re-formatting flows of biodiversity-
degrading capital and broader political economic norms and ideologies. Achieving
those changes requires addressing inequalities that inhibit policy change. We review
this research in Part 2 of this report.
4 Tendayi Achiume, 2019, p. 2.
5 While we prefer the terminology Global South and Global North, this briefing uses the terminology of
“developed countries” and “developing countries” as these are the terms used in the CBD and have legal
implications for rights and obligations.
6 Ibid.; Brand et al., 2016; Svampa, 2015.
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Part 3 considers the limitations and opportunities of existing financial
mechanisms and strategies, with a focus on approaches such as payment for
ecosystem services (PES) and Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation (REDD+), as well as private and blended finance schemes. It also
examines voluntary and market-based efforts to create sustainable supply chains
and to manifest more sustainable financial flows. Given the conditions of debt and
austerity, there is often enormous hype about new mechanisms, particularly the
possibility of attracting new, private finance into biodiversity and “nature-based
solutions” (NBS) to climate change, but also market-like structures to advance CBD
objectives. We consider the degree to which these efforts have worked, on their
own terms and those of the CBD. Are they generating positive impacts for
biodiversity? Is private finance moving to advance CBD decisions? The answers
suggest that the effort to encourage financial markets to move from biodiversity-
eroding activities to SDG- and CBD-aligned objectives has failed, and that we need
to instead regulate finance to achieve needed outcomes.
Across all three parts of this report, our primary research questions are:
(1) What are the overarching political economic conditions under which resources
have been – and are being – mobilised for the implementation of the CBD?
(2) To what extent have private, innovative/market-based, and voluntary financial/
economic initiatives advanced the implementation of the CBD? What are the
primary challenges?
Our team is composed of social scientists from the University of British
Columbia in Canada (Jessica Dempsey, Adriana DiSilvestro, Audrey Irvine-Broque,
Fernanda Rojas-Marchini, Sara Nelson, Andrew Schuldt), Lancaster University in
the UK (Patrick Bigger, Jens Christiansen), and Duke University in the US (Elizabeth
Shapiro-Garza). The emphasis in this report stems from our particular areas of
expertise: political ecology, political economy of nature, multi-scalar environmental
governance and environmental change, and the uneven distribution of
environmental damage and biodiversity loss.
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Summary
Part 1. Ecological debts mount alongside ongoing inequalities and
biodiversity loss
Article 20 of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) points to countries’
common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) in fulfilling the commitments to
halt biodiversity loss – developed countries’ governments have an obligation to
provide new and additional financial resources to enable governments in developing
countries to effectively implement their commitments. We ask: Have governments
lived up to obligations in line with CBDR? What has been the role of the GEF in
relation to CBDR? In the third section of Part 1, we ask a related question: Who is
responsible for biodiversity loss? Can this responsibility or debt be calculated?
1.1 Wealthy states have not lived up to CBDR and commitments made under
Article 20
Twenty-eight years after the CBD was ratified in 1992, countries around the
world not only have failed to halt biodiversity loss, but they have also neglected
a fundamental principle of this Convention: that despite all countries’
responsibility for the loss of biodiversity, rich industrialised nations have a
greater share of responsibility and must, consequently, contribute with more
resources to stop this crisis. Neither the GEF itself – established as the CBD’s
financial mechanism in 1994 – nor the private finance mechanisms it promotes
have met these obligations.
1.2 Investments through the Global Environment Facility have been insufficient
Approximately 30 years on from the GEF’s launch, it is clear that the fund and
its approach have been insufficient to “implement the CBD”, one of its key
objectives. The amounts committed to the GEF are inadequate, with the most
recent GEF-7 seeing a nominal decline in new pledged amounts as well as
total funding. The GEF’s emphasis on leveraging co-financing from
governments, development finance institutions, non-governmental
organisations, and commercial actors is symptomatic of an approach that
assumes that public funding, not the natural environment and its diversity, is
the main resource that is scarce. Some research suggests that current funding
strategies are not just insufficient, but can further long-term international
power inequalities where countries with the most financial resources dictate
the terms and conditions under which capital will flow towards biodiversity-
rich countries, consolidating geopolitical power relations rather than working
towards full CBD implementation. The emphasis on co-financing, and
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increasingly the use of market-led funding for NBS, can be seen as a result of
these power inequalities. The GEF’s inability to effectively implement the three
objectives of the CBD, combined with the geopolitics in the background of
negotiations, suggests the need to reform this multilateral financial mechanism.
1.3 Wealthy countries and the affluent have mounting ecological debts
In this section, we draw on research attempting to quantify historical ecological
and climate debts that rich industrialised countries have accrued over the last
500 years through their overuse of the world’s resources and waste sinks. We
describe concepts such as “material footprint” and “national responsibility
for climate breakdown”, together with statistics indicating the over-
consumption of developed countries and affluent elites in developing countries
to flesh out historical patterns that demonstrate who benefited from ecological
damage, and who has borne the costs of these changes. This uneven
distribution of ecological degradation continues to this day, with one study
concluding the US is responsible for 40% of climate change and the EU 29%.
Other studies point to how current trade regimes further inequality through
conditions described as “ecologically unequal exchange”, where high-income
countries appropriate resources and generate higher levels of economic value.
Through these processes, the ecological and climate debts of developed
countries to developing countries continue to accrue.
Part 2. Understanding the global political economy of biodiversity loss
What is hampering the adequate resourcing of CBD implementation? Across Part
2, we ask: What are the overarching political economic conditions constraining CBD
implementation? We centre the political economic drivers that fuel extractivism,
drivers that render the relatively much smaller funding for conservation inadequate
to address the three objectives of the CBD. This section travels some distance from
what is usually considered in discussions of biodiversity policy and finance, but we
argue that many of the changes required to reshape structural drivers will have to
occur through a range of institutions that shape the global economy.
2.1 The ability of countries to implement the objectives of the CBD is hampered
by the debt-austerity nexus
Austerity and debt put a straightjacket on national governments across the
globe, but in particular in  developing countries. Austerity – policies that aim
to reduce government spending and deficits – means inadequate levels of
official development assistance (ODA), multilateral contributions, or domestic
funding for environmental ends. Austerity emerges from ideological
preferences found in institutions, but it is also concretely caused by a “race to
the bottom” in corporate tax rates, tax havens, and high levels of international
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debt, particularly in developing countries. If governments are focused – or
made to focus – on repaying debt, they are not investing in public goods; they
lack resources to implement biodiversity policies that advance sustainable use,
conservation and equitable benefit-sharing of biodiversity use. Adding fuel to
the fire, high levels of debt repayment also force governments to double down
on the resource extraction for export that is at the root of much biodiversity
loss. With many developing countries facing soaring debt levels in the face of
the COVID-19 pandemic, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has once
again stepped in to demand fiscal consolidation, despite clear linkages between
austerity, debt, and biodiversity loss. Such austerity measures will once again
structurally limit government spending in developing countries, with all the
attendant impacts on public health, both human and ecosystemic.
2.2 Inequity-reinforcing policies, corporate-focused trade rules, and investment
policies further entrench drivers of biodiversity loss
The rules that govern international trade contribute, directly and indirectly, to
biodiversity loss. The free movement of goods and finance that has been at
the heart of global trade policy over the last 45 years has not only exacerbated
wealth inequality in much of the world, but has also pushed the biodiversity
loss embodied in that trade to unprecedented levels. Unmitigated financial
flows and the operations of footloose extractive firms have opened new, fragile,
biodiversity-rich spaces for commodity production, widening the gap between
those who live with the environmental consequences of extraction and those
who benefit from consuming the goods those commodities comprise. The
rules that govern international capital flows do little to restrict detrimental,
large-scale movements of money in and out of countries, producing fiscal
vulnerability that, perversely, incentivises countries to increase raw material
exports. Furthermore, extractivism not only leaves highly differentiated costs
and benefits in its wake, but existing inequalities along racial, gender and wealth
lines can provide a legitimation or even fuel for extractivist developments.
Overall, the last few decades of hyperglobalisation and free-floating finance
have led to further concentrations of wealth and power that impede both
policy change and functioning multilateralism.
2.3 Biodiversity finance is outpaced by harmful subsidies that are challenging to
identify and reform
Parties to the CBD recognise the need to “eliminate, phase-out or reform”
incentives that are harmful to biodiversity as a primary strategy for halting
biodiversity loss. Yet institutional commitments to action on this matter remain
largely unfulfilled; reforming harmful incentives is one of the worst-performing
of the 20 Aichi Biodiversity Targets. Public spending on harmful incentives
and subsidies continues to eclipse domestic and international spending on
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biodiversity initiatives while undercutting biodiversity finance’s goals. Harmful
subsidies have been on the CBD agenda since at least 1995, but roadblocks to
reform have won out: lack of transparency, entrenched political interests, and
proportionally marginal but still significant impacts on community livelihoods
that, in turn, generate political capital. While harmful subsidies tend to
disproportionately benefit the wealthy and powerful, they also represent a
wider range of interests enmeshed in state politics, making them challenging
to write off altogether. Targeted research and reporting into the political
functions and environmental and social outcomes of these subsidies is required
in order to create accountability and enact reform against this driver of
biodiversity loss.
Part 3. Understanding biodiversity-related financial flows
Working within the framework of global political economic norms – such as austerity
and the consistent prioritisation of trade and investment interests over public goods
– governments, parts of civil society, and international institutions have promoted
voluntary measures and innovative financial mechanisms, including payments for
ecosystem services (PES), private finance and blended finance. To what extent have
these private, market-based, and voluntary financial initiatives advanced the
implementation of the CBD?  What are their primary challenges? To what degree
can these approaches support the broader transformative change called for by IPBES
in 2019 and by Indigenous, environmental justice, and social movements for many
decades previous?
3.1 Market-oriented approaches, such as PES and REDD+, offer insufficient finance
and mixed results for biodiversity
PES programmes have been increasingly promoted in the past few decades,
including within the CBD, as a way of generating new sources of revenue for
conservation and for compensating individuals and communities for the
livelihood impacts of conservation, with over 550 programmes worldwide.
We define PES as direct payments or in-kind transfers to individual or collective
landholders that aim to incentivise, compensate, or reward land uses beneficial
for the production of pre-defined ecosystem services. We include programmes
such as water funds and some REDD+ projects that may not self-define as
PES, but share these same characteristics. Four main lessons are evident in
the literature with regard to the role of PES in supporting biodiversity
conservation: 1) PES do not represent a major new source of private
conservation finance; 2) there are few biodiversity-focused PES, and those
that exist tend to prioritise habitat for a single species; 3) there are research
gaps regarding biodiversity outcomes for PES, but existing studies show mixed
results; and 4) programmes that have been most successful at addressing
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land use change linked with biodiversity loss have been integrated with local
traditions and institutions with strong representation of local values and
knowledge and equitable benefit-sharing of biodiversity use. Many PES
schemes, particularly those that are also meant to deliver climate benefits
(like REDD+), are now being promoted as NBS that can minimise the costs and
domestic actions that rich countries must undertake to stabilise rates of
environmental change, with often dubious social and environmental outcomes
in the countries in which they are deployed.
3.2 Private investment in biodiversity-enhancing projects is small, geographically
constrained, and in a perpetual state of “proof of concept”
The state of play regarding the scale and scope of “private investment” –
return-generating, profit-oriented biodiversity conservation finance – depicts
an emerging but halting, precarious, and still largely promissory global
economic sector concentrated in developed countries. Such evidence is at
odds with how this sector is commonly portrayed in international policy and
within conservation literature, which often looks to the sector as a primary
solution to their funding issues. Based on the last 30 years of efforts – from
bioprospecting to forest-based carbon offsets – it is difficult to make
biodiversity conservation into a profitable enterprise, raising questions about
the role of private finance in future implementation of the CBD objectives,
particularly through NBS. However, it is crucial to note that even these relatively
small amounts of financial investment can have negative social impacts and
further entrench social inequalities. They can also serve as narrative “bandaids”
that, through constant promotion as the primary solution to biodiversity loss,
pose barriers to achieving the more difficult but needed transformative change.
We argue that, rather than using public capital to catalyse private sector
investment, the efforts of governments and multilateral organisations should
be focused on modifying global political economic relations – such as tax
regimes, trade agreements, and regulations – to prevent negative impacts on
biodiversity.
3.3 Blended finance is unlikely to deliver a sustainable future
The notion of blended finance has gained traction within development policy
circles since the advent of the Sustainable Development Goals and has recently
been hailed as a tool for mobilising private investments in CBD implementation.
While there is still confusion and debate about its definition, blended finance
is often defined as any use of public, philanthropic or supranational funding
to “leverage”, “unlock” or “catalyse” private investments. This concessional or
grant capital is said to be necessary to drive private capital into areas like
biodiversity conservation or sustainable use that are seen by investors as too
risky or offering too little return. We argue that blended finance should be
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seen in the longer history of development finance, which has been used to
facilitate private investment. Blended finance is better understood as a
continuation of public-private-partnership-style approaches that come with
reduced transparency and risks of private gain/public loss, and that fail to
benefit countries with the lowest incomes. Further, it is important to complicate
this need to attract private capital into CBD implementation, as it is
symptomatic of broader political economic trends like austerity and inadequate
financial sector regulation. The literature also raises questions about the
efficiency of blended finance. For example, between 2008 and 2015,
multilateral development banks (MDBs), states and supranationals disbursed
EUR17.2 billion through various channels to directly support the development
of REDD+ programmes across the world. This public investment has netted all
of EUR162 million in direct private investment for REDD+ projects and, while
“indirect” private investment is higher, it is unclear how much of that
investment is “additional” to what might have happened otherwise. Additional
biodiversity benefits are also unclear.
3.4 Voluntary certification and disclosure schemes may have some impact, but
rarely on the scale necessary to halt biodiversity loss
Since the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, where global corporate elites and developed
countries pushed aside a regulatory approach to harmful environmental
activities, voluntary approaches, such as certification and disclosure schemes,
have proliferated. The commonality between these approaches is that
compliance – and thus authority – is predominantly rooted not in the state,
but in the market, which has little incentive, authority or ability to enforce
binding actions. In this section we examine the outcomes of various voluntary
strategies in the decades since Rio, and consider the significance of their role
in halting global biodiversity loss. Measuring the real impacts of these schemes
is difficult not only due to lack of controls and baselines, but also because
many are private and thus difficult to scrutinise. Despite this, there is a growing
body of research pointing to their limitations. Overall, the nature of voluntary
mechanisms – that is, the lack of enforcement or accountability – leaves us
with a great deal of publicity surrounding these alternatives to strong state-
driven policies, but, ultimately, very marginal impacts. We question the
continued rollout of new voluntary efforts such as the Task Force for Nature-
related Disclosure (TFND), when there is little evidence that such efforts will
be able to provide change on the scale or within the time frame needed to
meaningfully halt biodiversity loss.
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Part 1
Ecological debts mount alongside ongoing
inequalities and biodiversity loss
Article 20 of the CBD points to countries’ CBDR in fulfilling the commitments to halt
biodiversity loss. It states that wealthier  (“developed”) countries should pay for the
actions of less-wealthy (“developing”) countries towards the conservation and
sustainable use of biodiversity.7 Controversially, the GEF – located in Washington
D.C. and with the World Bank as its Trustee – was created as the financial mechanism
for implementing the globally significant actions taken to conserve, sustainably use,
and share the benefits of biodiversity. In the first two sections, we ask: have
governments lived up to commitments to CBDR? What has been the role of the
GEF in relation to CBDR?
While negotiations under the CBD often focus on obligations under Article
20, and reports on finance often focus on calculating the gap in actual vs. required
finance, there is a growing body of research that aims to calculate responsibility for
historical and ongoing biodiversity loss and climate damage. This research is often
conducted through methodologies of ecological and climate debts, and by calculating
the material footprints of international trade. In the third section of Part 1, we ask:
who is responsible for biodiversity loss? Can this responsibility or debt be calculated?
We present and define three mechanisms to measure the ecological and climate
debts rich countries have accrued, while addressing recent research elaborating on
material footprints and global trade impacts as other ways of framing CBDR.
Key points
1.1 Wealthy states have not lived up to CBDR & commitments made under Article
20
1.2 Investments through the GEF have been insufficient for addressing Article 20
1.3 Wealthy countries and affluent citizens/people are more responsible for climate
change and biodiversity loss
7 Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992, p.13.
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1.1 Wealthy states have not lived up to CBDR & commitments made under
Article 20
Wealthy states have failed to live up to their obligations on CBDR. On a macro
scale, financing for biodiversity conservation and development in so-called
“developing” countries “falls well short of amounts promised in Rio by wealthy
nations”.8 Miller et al. identified an increase of aid funds for biodiversity since 1992
(amounting to USD 1.1 billion annually), which corresponds to the creation of the
GEF in 1991.9 However, the amounts registered are far from the primary agreements
made in Rio under Agenda 21, where countries committed about USD 18 billion
annually for global environmental issues, of which USD 2 billion were directly
designated for biodiversity protection. In fact, no donor nation has met its
commitment “in any year since making this promise in 1992. Total funding is 58%
of the Rio promise,” Miller et al. observe.10 The authors also warn that previous
sources that estimate financial aid toward biodiversity protection tend to be
overstated because the underlying data is sourced from donor-reported numbers
obtained by intergovernmental institutions like the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) Creditor Reporting System.
More generally, in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, budgets for Official
Development Assistance (ODA) have been mostly flat in real terms and falling
relatively. Only five countries met the OECD target of 0.7% of Gross National Income
(GNI) for ODA in 2018. Without neglecting the important historical critique that
some ODA has been used to promote donor countries’ economic interests, the
paucity of financial transfers through ODA has serious ramifications not only for
the achievement of CBD objectives, but in ethical registers as well. Legacies of
colonialism and ongoing unequal exchange have transferred and continue to transfer
wealth from developing countries to developed countries.11 The lack of commitment
on the part of developed countries to share the financial burden indicates a failure
to take threats stemming from biodiversity loss seriously and undermines the
international solidarity and coordination that is critical to ameliorating biodiversity
loss.
8 Miller et al., 2013, p. 17.
9 According to Miller et al., 2013, the GEF’s overall commitment to biodiversity aid funding has been of USD
5,110,000,000, corresponding to 28% of total financial flows categorised as “aid” (and placing the GEF in
second place after the World Bank).
10 Miller et al., 2013, p. 16.
11 See for example Bracking, 2009.
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1.2 Investments through the Global Environment Facility have been
insufficient
When the Global Environment Facility (GEF) was first agreed as a pilot facility
in 1990, there was no guarantee that it would become a central institution for
funding CBD-defined global biodiversity objectives. Created out of the 1992 Rio
Earth Summit – also known as the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED) – the GEF subsequently became a critical node in the effort
to fulfil the aims of Article 20 of the CBD through its different implementing agencies.
Its role was further consolidated in 1994 with the first replenishment of funding.
Thirty years on from the GEF’s launch, it is clear that the fund and its approach have
been insufficient to “implement the CBD”, one of its key objectives.
Geopolitics and neocolonialism in the GEF
From the outset, the GEF has been shaped by geopolitical struggles, which
are evident to this day in the ideas that govern its operations. As highlighted by
Sjöberg in her examination of early discussions on structuring the GEF, developing
countries emphasised notions of transparency, participation and democratic
decision-making while the industrialised North tended to emphasise economic
efficiency.  The latter furthermore argued that decision-making processes should
be differentiated according to financial contributions, which aligned with the
tradition of the Bretton Woods institutions where dollars equal voting rights rather
than the “one country, one vote” ethos of the United Nations system.12 The
distinction is currently being replayed in some powerful developed countries’
promotion of NBS to offset or displace, rather than absolutely reduce, environmental
impacts of their consumption.13
For critics of the GEF, the institution’s linkages with its Trustee, the World
Bank, were always difficult to ignore. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
critiqued the Bank’s dubious environmental records while governments of
developing countries tended to perceive its approach as technocratic, if not outright
colonial.14 Large donors to the GEF, like the United States, have been able to shape
its priorities with their contributions, even though they are not signatories to the
agreements the GEF is largely meant to fund. These influences have been sources
of conflict. For example, in the negotiations for the fourth GEF replenishment, China
and the G77 countries expressed concern that the US governance standards would




be incorporated into the GEF resource allocation framework (RAF), biasing fund
disbursement towards countries with free market-enabling conditions.15 Despite
concerns that the RAF was largely driven by ideology, the RAF was adopted by the
GEF Council. This was, in large part, a means of ensuring US engagement in GEF-4
since the US had threatened to cut funding and that would pose a significant risk to
the GEF.16 Under the current governance structure of the GEF, efforts to increase
flows of funds may perversely further neocolonial relationships where countries
with the most financial resources dictate the terms and conditions under which
capital will flow towards biodiversity-rich countries, consolidating uneven geopolitical
relations, rather than primarily working toward CBD implementation.  Rather than
being an institution for promoting geopolitical interests and market-based
environmental governance, whose insufficient outcomes we examine in Part 3, GEF
spending needs to acknowledge and support the ability of  Indigenous communities,
small-scale peasants and fishers to autonomously safeguard biodiversity.
Co-financing: whose leverage and whose debt?
The GEF’s emphasis on leveraging co-financing from governments,
development finance institutions, non-governmental organisations, and commercial
actors is symptomatic of an approach that assumes that public funding, not the
natural environment and its diversity, is the main resource that is scarce.17 The GEF
considers any resources mobilised from GEF partner agencies and non-GEF actors
towards GEF projects to be co-financing.18 This emphasis on co-financing has long
been a matter of debate. First, it is questionable whether co-finance is indeed
additional funding or just a relabelling of other funding sources.19 Even if we assume
that attracting co-financing is the right approach, this strategy seems to fail on its
own terms since biodiversity is one of the GEF focal areas with the lowest amount
of co-financing relative to GEF financing.20 Another sticking point is the question of
who provides the co-financing. Government financing is by far the largest share of
co-financing in the biodiversity focal area,21 and it is difficult to give a complete
assessment of the GEF’s private sector engagement, but the GEF largely sees itself
as historically being able to promote an ecosystem for private investments and as
15 Ervine, 2007.
16 Clémençon, 2006, p. 60.
17 Later, we specifically address so-called “blended finance”, which is the attempt to leverage private, for-profit
finance in particular. In contrast to blended finance’s attempt to leverage for-profit investments, the GEF’s
efforts to leverage further monetary resources include public and private financing alike.
18 For an exact definition by the GEF, see Global Environment Facility, 2018b, p. 3.
19 Clémençon suggests that a substantial part of  total co-financing is merely relabelling, not necessarily new
sources of finance, especially in the forestry and energy sectors. Clémençon, 2006, p. 54.
20 Kotchen & Negi, 2019.
21 Global Environment Facility 2020, p. 2; Miller & Yu, 2012.
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being able to play a central role in blended finance and for-profit, private biodiversity
finance in the future.22
The fiercest critique of the way GEF funding has been mobilised as a means of
co-financing was levelled by Zoe Young in the early 2000s, who followed the
development of the GEF during its first decade and interviewed experts who were
involved in its making. From Young’s perspective, the concessional loans or grant
funding from the GEF could facilitate a pipeline of projects for World Bank funding
for already indebted governments in developing countries. However, in return for
these new sources of financing, cash-strapped developing countries risk losing part
of their sovereignty as their territory and resources are opened up for international
markets.23 Certainly, for the entire GEF portfolio (not just biodiversity) loans continue
to play an important role.24 In light of such critiques, it remains important to attend
to the geopolitical effects of GEF funding: Does this funding merely help governments
in developing countries get cheaper financing, does it politically lead to a change in
national governments’ priorities, or has it led to further indebtedness for developing
countries?
How much $?
Even if we assume that more money will always result in better biodiversity
outcomes, funding conditions have not always improved during the lifespan of the
GEF. From the first replenishment, GEF funding levels (for the entire GEF portfolio)
have often been disappointing; whereas the aim of the first replenishment had
been to mobilise 2-3 billion Special Drawing Rights (SDR), which at the time of the
negotiations were equivalent to USD 2.8-4.2 billion, the final commitment ended
at merely USD 2 billion.25 Although there was a nominal funding increase with GEF-
2, funding has declined in real, inflation-adjusted terms between  the GEF-1 funding
replenishment in 1994 and the GEF-4 replenishment (GEF-4 included). What seems
like increases between replenishment periods were mainly due to carry-over of
funds from previous replenishments.26 Since then, the fifth GEF replenishment
period did see nominal increases in funding. However, while the sixth replenishment
did see an increase in new pledged amounts relative to GEF-5, the increase in total
nominal funding would not have happened without carry-over from GEF-5. Finally,
22 As a GEF evaluation report on private sector engagement (in the entire GEF portfolio) from 2017 notes, the
GEF PMIS does not contain information that easily allows one to assess the GEF’s private sector engagement.
Global Environment Facility Independent Evaluation Office, 2017, pp. 65, 68.
23 Young, 2002.
24 Global Environment Facility 2020, p. 2.
25 Sjöberg, 1999, p. 36.




GEF-7 even saw a nominal decline in new pledged amounts as well as total funding
(see figure below, not adjusted for inflation).
Figure 1. Historical pledged amounts to GEF replenishments (USD billion)27
27 Global Environment Facility, 2017, p. 9; Global Environment Facility, 2018a, p. 4. Figure 1 draws data from
these GEF reports, but in the course of our research we noticed discrepancies: what is found in the 2017
GEF report does not match data in the summary of negotiations for individual replenishments. We therefore
acknowledge that there could be some accounting discrepancies between the data we include for GEF-7
and previous replenishments.
28 Convention on Biological Diversity, 2020b, p. 13.
While a rough official assessment is that the GEF has directed over USD 3.5
billion to biodiversity,28 it is difficult to discern the total amount going towards
biodiversity-related objectives during individual replenishments. We have started
research towards assessing this in Appendix A, but further study is needed along
with increased GEF transparency, which would require systems for a more granular
breakdown of the GEF’s historical spending for biodiversity. The take-home from
the data presented in Appendix A is that actual GEF spending during the GEF-2,
GEF-3 and GEF-4, which in total covers the period between 1998 and 2010, clearly
fell short of the original programming targets. Like the entire GEF portfolio during
that period, the biodiversity focal area did not fulfil the original biodiversity
21
programming as they appear in Summary of Negotiations documents for individual
replenishments. Future research needs to examine the types of projects financed
by the GEF (e.g. protected areas vs. ABS financing) and the types of funding received
by different states and organisations.
1.3 Wealthy countries and the affluent have mounting ecological debts
Since Rio, researchers have sought not simply to understand the incremental
costs of CBD implementation, but also to develop a more fulsome accounting of
responsibility for ecological change between and within nations. This responsibility
has been quantified around climate change and biodiversity loss, two domains that
have been treated by research on climate and ecological debts. Attention along
these two lines is critical not only because climate change poses accelerating risks
to biodiversity,29 but also because it is impossible to separate contemporary wealth
inequalities (which condition responses to biodiversity loss) from climate debt. Some
are more responsible for environmental degradation than others, or, to put it
otherwise, some are more in debt for their (over)use of resources that degrade
ecosystems.
Research that estimates the share of countries’ responsibilities for climate
change and biodiversity loss has insisted that wealthy nations should be held
accountable for decades – and centuries – of ecological degradation. In a 2020
article published in The Lancet, Jason Hickel quantifies what he calls “national
responsibility for climate breakdown”, to determine responsibility for global
emissions in excess of planetary boundaries – or exceeding a safe emissions budget.30
He shows that high-income countries have a greater degree of responsibility for
climate damage than previous estimates.31 The USA is responsible for 40% of excess
emissions, and the EU for 29%. Furthermore,  G8 countries are responsible for 85%
of climate breakdown, and Hickel observes that countries classified by the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as Annex 1 (defined
as “developed”) are responsible for 90% of emissions exceeding the planetary
boundary.
29 Trisos et al., 2020; Urban, 2015.
30 Hickel, 2020.
31 Hickel (2020) frames responsibility upon the idea that “countries that have contributed more to global
emissions are more responsible for related problems than those that have contributed less”. He put this
framework of responsibility in dialogue with the “principles of planetary boundaries and equal access to
atmospheric resources” (p. 399).
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Figures like the one above indicate that high-income countries have a greater
degree of responsibility for climate damages than previous methods have implied.
The extent to which wealthy nations are responsible for ecological and climate
damage could parallel or even exceed the financial debts that many developing
countries have with their creditors. Such a debtor condition, moreover, may be
reversed if climate responsibilities become visible and monetised. Environmental
activists in developing countries coined the term “ecological debt” to flag the
historical inequalities in the access and use of natural commons. In what follows,
we present the concept of ecological debt and the more contemporary concepts of
climate debt and material footprint.
Ecological debt and responsibility
First mobilised by Latin American activists, the concept of ecological debt has
circulated among environmentalists in developing countries since the early 1990s.33
One definition signals “nature’s vital heritage, necessary for its balance and
reproduction, that has been consumed and not returned to it”, including species
and ecological conditions.34 As its name suggests, ecological debt entails “ecological
32 Source: Hickel, 2020, p. 403.
33 Mickelson, 2005.
34 Robleto & Marcelo, 1992. Also see Warlenius et al., 2015.
Figure 2: Responsibility for climate breakdown32
Responsibility to climate breakdown
USA (40%)
EU-28 (29%)
Rest of Europe (13%)
Rest of Global North (10%)
Global South (8%)
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creditors”, countries that deliver environmental resources (developing countries),
and “ecological debtors”, advanced industrialised countries that have used these
resources without compensating for their ecological value. The concept of ecological
debt highlights the circulation of ecological value from developing countries to
developed countries for more than 500 years. This value originates and flows through
landscapes of extractivism, which today are, as Maristella Svampa points out, part
of a process of neoextractive development characterised by a “pattern of
accumulation based on the overexploitation of generally nonrenewable natural
resources”35 – always at the expense of biodiversity. Thinking through ecological
debt highlights that the wealth of developed countries today depends, and has
historically depended, on the “extractive” devaluation of developing countries.36
Leading ecological economist Joan Martinez-Alier suggested two decades ago
that a proper calculus of the ecological debt is far from complete, insisting on the
need to develop a variety of instruments to estimate responsibilities and inequalities
among nations.37 Recent research has made similar claims. Goeminne and Paredis
argue, for instance, that ecological debt can reorient intergovernmental negotiations
on sustainability towards more historical understandings of environmental (in)justice,
also noting the difficulties entailed in its calculus.38 To dodge such difficulties, they
argue for a variety of methods to complement the approach based on ecological
debt. Here we present climate debt and material footprint as parametric approaches
to estimate differentiated responsibilities among nations while connecting this
planetary responsibility to biodiversity loss.
Climate and ecological debt
The Third World Network (TWN) defines climate debt as a combination of
industrialised rich countries’ “emissions debt” (excessive per person emissions) and
“adaptation debt” (what developing countries require to adapt, both materially
and financially). The sum of these debts, TWN observes, constitutes rich countries’
“climate debt, which is part of a larger ecological, social and economic debt owed
by the rich industrialized world to the poor majority”.39 Such wide framing of climate
debt necessarily includes the loss of biodiversity. But the calculus of climate debt is
not an easy task. According to the Transnational Institute, climate debt cannot be
fully calculated as it encompasses more than 500 years of exploitation and
plundering through unequal relations between developed and developing
35 Svampa, 2015, p. 66.
36 Dempsey et al., 2019.
37 Martinez-Alier, 1997. Also see more recent work in Martinez-Alier, 2014.
38 Goeminne & Paredis, 2009.
39 Third World Network, 2009, p. 1 (emphasis ours). The concept of climate debt was taken up by environmental
movements in the early 2000s. According to Pickering & Barry (2012), in its most general approach, climate
debt represents a frame to understand how responsibility for climate change should be shared among nations.
For more, see Warlenius, 2018.
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countries.40 But efforts have been made to quantify inequalities among countries
resorting to shorter time periods. For instance, Matthews developed a framework
to quantify carbon and climate debts between 1990 and 2013, measuring
greenhouse emissions from traditional sources and from land-use change, alongside
their effects on climate warming.41 His results highlight the United States as the
leading country above their share of CO2 emissions and land-use-change-induced
climate warming. In contrast, India has the lowest per-capita carbon emissions and
land-use changes in relation to its per-capita share.
Almost a decade before Matthews, Srinivasan et al. elaborated a framework
to estimate human activities’ environmental costs between 1961 and 2000 and
quantified these costs relating to low, medium, and high-income countries.42 The
authors estimated each group represented 32%, 50%, and 18% of the world
population, respectively, and yet, they were separately responsible for 13%, 45%,
and 42% of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, respectively. In terms of the revenues
extracted from biodiversity loss, the external costs from the degradation caused by
deforestation represented up to 52% of industrial roundwood and fuelwood
revenue,43 while mangrove loss sustained up to 63% of aquaculture fisheries
revenue.44  Regarding consumption,  Srinivasan et al. observe that between 1980
and 2000 low- and medium-income countries have sent 96% of their shrimp exports
to high-income countries (presenting the largest disconnection between suppliers
and consumers), while agricultural products and wood products were largely
consumed within the groups in which they were produced (94-98%).
The material footprint of global trade and consumption
International trade theory suggests that all parties benefit from capitalising
on their comparative advantages. But ecological economics research suggests this
is not the case, particularly when one accounts for the transfer of materials, energy,
land, and labour embodied in commodities and services traded between regions
with differing economic power. One recent study examined the regions of origin
and final consumption for four resource groups: materials, energy, land, and labour
in the global economy from 1990-2015. They found that the “value added per ton
of raw material embodied in exports is 11 times higher in high income countries”.45
40 Bullard, 2010.
41 Matthews, 2016.
42 Srinivasan et al., 2008.
43 Srinivasan et al. (2008) cite FAO to support this claim: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (2005), Global Forest Resources Assessment 2005 (FAO, Rome), FAO Forestry Paper 147.
44 According to Srinivasan et al., since 1980, there has been a loss of 35% of mangrove area.
45 Dorninger et al., 2020, online first, no page numbers.
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With the exception of China and India, what they term ongoing “ecologically unequal
exchange” effectively “allows high-income countries to simultaneously appropriate
resources and to generate a monetary surplus through international trade”.46
Another line of research has tried to address countries’ dependency on
international trade of raw materials that drive extraction and biodiversity loss.
Wiedmann et al., for instance, propose an indicator called the “material footprint”
(MF) defined as “the global allocation of used raw material extraction to the final
demand of an economy” with the goal of signalling a country’s responsibility – in
terms of consumer responsibility – for “impacts associated with raw material
extractions worldwide”.47 International trade, the authors observe, relies on the
extraction, processing, and transporting of raw materials, pushing biodiversity loss
further.48 A result Wiedmann et al. highlight is the elevated rate of global raw
materials that goes to the sustenance of exports; according to the authors, two-
fifths of all global raw materials are “extracted and used just to enable exports of
goods and services to other countries”.49
The impacts of global trade are multifarious and differ across territories and
scales. For the case of biodiversity impacts, Chaudhary and Brooks recently estimated
the global biodiversity impacts caused by per-country consumption and those
impacts associated with international trade.50 Projecting IUCN (International Union
for Conservation of Nature) scenarios of species extinctions combined with land-
use projections, the authors show that 927 species are projected to go extinct due
to global land use; 25% of these extinctions are directly resulting from production
for exports.
What about domestic wealth inequalities & responsibility?
Indicators that calculate unequal responsibilities among nations, such as
ecological debt, climate debt, or material footprint, are attempts to bring the
ecological crisis into parametric frameworks with formulas to implement payment
systems agreed upon during climate negotiations. However, it is crucial to bear in
mind that in addition to quantifying climate debt among countries, socioeconomic
and socioecological inequalities within countries that lead to what we may call
“domestic ecological debts” are still a matter of concern. As decades of
environmental justice research and advocacy show, the costs and benefits of
ecological change are vastly inequitable globally and locally, often marked by class,
racial, and gender lines (a topic we return to in the section below). A recent
46 Ibid, online first, no page numbers.
47 Wiedmann et al., 2015.
48 Ibid., p. 6275.
49 Wiedmann et al., 2015, p. 6272.
50 Chaudhary & Brooks, 2019.
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51 Wiedmann et al., 2020.
52 Ibid., p. 4.
53 McElwee et al., 2020, p. 15.
54 Maniates, 2001.
publication in Nature Communications makes this point clear. Wiedmann et al. argue
that “affluent citizens” are responsible for most environmental impacts.51 According
to the authors, the primary drivers of environmental change are, by far, consumption
and technological change, making specific human activities more damaging in terms
of the impacts they cause on the climate. In this vein, the authors insist that any
green transition needs to achieve “far-reaching lifestyle changes”. However, such
changes are not readily achievable, since the super-affluent have vested interests
in “maintaining the capitalist system and favourable conditions for capital
accumulation”, which can lead to political influence and corruption to support
environmentally-damaging activities.52
In sum, work quantifying ecological debt, climate debt, and material footprint
is useful for fleshing out historical patterns concerned with who benefited from
ecological damage, and who bore the costs of these changes. This necessary work
should bring wealth inequalities to the forefront, understood to exist both among
and within nations. Drawing from the World Wildlife Fund (WWF)’s Global Futures
Report, McElwee et al. claim that “no sustainable future that meets both human
needs and stays within planetary boundaries is possible without decreases in
consumption among the wealthier nations”.53 It is clear that consumption practices
among the rich require substantial transformation, but they should not detract from
addressing structural inequalities and historically patterned forms of injustice. As
researchers like Michael Maniates show, social movement activism focusing
exclusively on consumption can obscure the role of structural wealth inequalities
that fuel overconsumption, and direct our attention away from the need for political,
economic, and social change in order to achieve more equitable use of the world’s
resources54 – a substantial transformation necessary to keep and nurture biodiverse
life on this planet.
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Reports on biodiversity finance from states, bankers, and conservation organisations
explain ongoing biodiversity loss by gesturing to the disjuncture – the gap – between
current financial resources and the necessary resources to adequately support the
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. In this part of the report, we survey
broader political economic trends that can help explain why resources are so small,
and why resources are often ineffective compared to ongoing investments in
extractivism. Across all the sections of Part 2, we ask: what are the overarching
political economic conditions constraining CBD implementation?
This section travels some distance from what is usually considered in
discussions of biodiversity policy and finance. Many of the changes required to
reshape the structural drivers will have to occur through a range of institutions that
shape the global economy, far from the Ministries of Environment and far from the
Convention on Biological Diversity. This research suggests the  importance of not
simply mainstreaming biodiversity domestically into Ministries of Finance and
Natural Resources, as the CBD has advocated for many years, but mainstreaming it
into the global political economic structures – into trade and financial rules.
2.1 The ability of countries to implement the objectives of the CBD is hampered
by the debt-austerity nexus
2.2 Inequity-reinforcing policies, corporate-focused trade rules, and investment
policies further entrench drivers of biodiversity loss.
2.3 Biodiversity finance is outpaced by harmful subsidies that are challenging to
identify and reform
2.1 The ability of countries to implement the objectives of the CBD is
hampered by the debt-austerity nexus
Introduction
The logic of austerity is baked into neoclassical economics, the ideological
infrastructure of the global economy.55 While global and regional inequality continues
to grow, key institutions and policy “common sense” continue to push for ever-
Part 2
Understanding the global political economy of
biodiversity loss
55 Hickel, 2017; Blyth, 2013.
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increasing levels of “free” trade and investment while limiting the capacity of
governments to manage its deleterious effects. This common sense continues to
hold sway even as some of its key proponents, like the IMF, have started to publicly
doubt its effectiveness for improving the outlook for most of humanity or the natural
environment.56
Yet despite this questioning, austerity remains on the global agenda, now either
repackaged as a fundamental component of resilience57 or framed in more familiar
and explicit terms like “belt-tightening”, which has already led, for example, Namibia
to privatise and auction off fishing rights.58 COVID-19 has shown that governments
can and will reach into deep pockets, and that international institutions like the IMF
will quickly lend to countries to meet urgent health and social protection as they
did in September 2020. But research shows that most (84%) of these loans require
fiscal consolidation measures – austerity – as early as 2021.59 In this section, we are
primarily focused on understanding how austerity and debt hinder the achievement
of CBD objectives.
Key points
• Austerity impedes the achievement of CBD objectives
• Bilateral and multilateral austerity fuels environmental injustice
• Debt-servicing continues to impede sustainable use and conservation of
biodiversity
Austerity impedes the achievement of CBD objectives
The logic of austerity and the serious funding constraints it produces for
environmental regulation are hampering the achievement of CBD objectives. The
first UN report on Environmental Rule of Law makes this clear, finding that many
environmental laws are unimplemented or unenforced around the world as
implementing ministries are “often under-resourced and under-funded”.60 Recent
models show that domestic conservation spending is tied to changes in biodiversity.
Waldron et al. show that increased state investment in environmental regulation
and enforcement results in less biodiversity loss, while correcting for pressures like
economic growth and agricultural expansion.61 Using this model the authors estimate
that reductions in biodiversity loss can accrue from as little as USD 5 million in
additional spending per annum; their model predicts that, for example, biodiversity
56 Ostry et al., 2016.
57 Daar & Tamale, 2020.
58 Africa Defense Forum, 2020; Munevar, 2020.
59 Daar & Tamale, 2020.
60 United Nations Environment Programme, 2019a.
61 Waldron et al., 2017.
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loss would decline by 33% for Papua New Guinea and 54% for Peru with a USD 5
million annual investment in conservation. Another study focusing on Australia
concluded it is spending only 15% of what is needed to avoid extinctions and recover
threatened species,62 demonstrating that lack of public expenditure is not just a
problem in the developing world, but a global problem.
This is not to say that more conservation spending is a silver bullet, but that
increased state spending can contribute to robust regulation and enforcement that
contributes to CBD objectives. The need to dramatically ramp up public spending is
echoed in the Third Report of the Panel of Experts on Resource Mobilization, who
note that
“The public sector should continue to play a lead role in providing a sustained flow of
resources for biodiversity conservation, sustainable use and restoration. The public
sector should increase direct domestic expenditure in recognition of the level of
ambition in the post-2020 global biodiversity framework for achieving the three
objectives of the Convention. This will be an essential component of increasing
resources for biodiversity, recognizing that many biodiversity-positive projects will need
to be financed out of public funds, given the fundamental nature of public goods, and
an understanding that, while it will be important to increase private sector finance,
this alone will never be sufficient for meeting all of the challenges of achieving the
post-2020 global biodiversity framework.”63
Further exacerbating austere spending on conservation, some countries have
imposed legal restrictions on civil society advocacy, including restrictions on funding.
That is, some countries are starving and criminalising the very entities that can help
ensure environmental laws are followed and, in many cases, created.64 The critical
need for highly active environmental third sector actors can also be emblematic of
austerity governance, as under-resourced governments and environmental
bureaucracies rely on NGOs and charities to fill gaps in public services. This is
especially true as austerity has drained capacity, or limited capacity development,
for mainstreaming biodiversity in national law-making and regulation. This is a point
also made in the Third Report of the Panel of Experts on Resource Mobilization,
noting that mainstreaming will require advancements in national capacity.65
62 Wintle et al., 2019.
63 Convention of Biological Diversity, 2020b, para 27, A.
64 See Tendayi Achiume, 2019.
65 Convention on Biological Diversity, 2020a, para 68.
30
Bilateral and multilateral austerity fuels global environmental injustice
The most recent (2020) OECD report on biodiversity finance provides rough
estimates for different funding streams earmarked for biodiversity conservation
under the umbrellas of public domestic, public international, and private finance.
The report finds aggregate spending of between USD 78-91 billion per year between
2015 and 2017, with the vast majority accounted for through public domestic
expenditure, and 95% of public expenditure accounted for by OECD countries.70
However, the authors shy away from generalising about concrete trends up or down
due to reporting and data inconsistencies. The authors cite lack of common reporting
methods, issues of double-counting, and troubles with voluntary reporting as
reasons why their dollar estimates of spending are conservative, flawed, and/or in
large ranges. This gap in reporting is a problem in and of itself (and, as the authors
note, could be rectified through CBD action), but we can still anecdotally characterise
changes in different types of spending that relate to CBD objectives by drawing
from other sources. The picture is discouraging, but consistent with what we know
Austerity and taxes
A major cause of public austerity can be found in inadequate tax regimes. One trend
over the past decades is a reduction in corporate tax rates. As Reyes summarises, the
US corporate tax rate has gone from 50% in the late 1960s down to 21% in 2017, the
UK went from 45% in the late 1960s to the rate of 18% in 2018, Eurozone tax rates
have also declined in just the past 15 years from 37% to 24% in 2018.66 This corporate
tax “race to the bottom” erodes “the tax base for public investment”, including needed
investments in health, green energy and implementation of the CBD.67 These low
corporate tax rates are compounded by tax avoidance and evasion by corporations
and the super wealthy, further reducing public resources, leading to further austerity.68
Ending this race to the tax bottom is a multilateral effort that will require regulating
global capital. As Kozul-Wright states, there are ideas and initiatives advancing these
discussions, including  “clamping down on tax havens in the North, establishing a global
asset registry to enable wealth taxes on the super-rich and moving to a unitary taxation
system that recognizes that the profits of international corporations are generated
collectively at the group level”.69
66 Reyes, 2020, p. 119.
67 Ibid, p. 126.
68 Reyes, 2020, Kozul-Wright, 2020.
69 Kozul-Wright, 2020, p. 160.
70 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2020a, pp. 3, 9.
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of austerity as a global phenomenon, particularly as it relates to public spending on
public goods like biodiversity.
First, the bulk of biodiversity spending occurs through domestic OECD public
investment in their own countries, so there is a serious spatial mismatch between
priority areas for biodiversity and application of capital. This is a problem for achieving
global targets, leaving aside the role of solidarity finance for paying back the
ecological debts – and of CBDR obligations – discussed in Part 1 of this report.
Second, the upper bound estimated by the OECD shows biodiversity funding through
official development aid topping out at USD 9.3 billion between 2015 and 2017,
well short of even the lowest bound estimate of USD 103 billion, much less the
upper bound of USD 895 billion that was estimated as necessary by the Second
Report of the Panel of Experts on Resource Mobilization.71 While ODA, in its current
form, is unlikely to comprise the majority of financial resources for conservation,
ODA represents less than 10% of projected needs even at the lowermost bound.
Post-financial crisis ODA has been mostly flat in real terms and falling relatively.
Only five countries met the OECD target of 0.7% GNI for ODA in 2018. In a recent
review of financial mechanisms for meeting the SDGs, Clark et al. find that the
investment needed for SDGs is between USD 3.3-4.5 trillion for developing countries,
but in 2015 ODA was only USD 132 billion across all 18 categories.72 While the
tendency is to turn to the private sector as the pot at the end of the rainbow, section
3.2 reviews the track record of private investment for achieving CBD objectives,
finding private investment to be limited in scale and scope, geographically
constrained and in a perennial “proof of concept” phase. Given the social,
environmental, cultural,and even existential consequences of failing to acheive the
SDGs in communities across developing countries, this mismatch between rhetoric
and reality requires urgent correction.
But, in line with the conclusions of this report, it is crucial to note that funding
alone is no silver bullet. There is literature that suggests that certain types of
environmental aid can increase trends like deforestation. One study found that
Norwegain bilateral aid for conservation had no impact on forest loss – with troubling
implications for focusing new initiatives on NBS.73 Another study examined the
impact of conservation aid on deforestation rates in 42 African countries between
2000 and 2013, concluding that conservation aid is correlated with deforestation.74
The study suggests that the amount of aid, the type of aid (to protected areas,
which can displace people and lead to leakage), the short-term nature of the aid,
and lack of good forest governance, is no match for the underlying forces driving
deforestation.
71 Convention on Biological Diversity, 2020c.
72 Clark et al., 2018.
73 Hermanrud & de Soysa, 2016.
74 Bare et al., 2015.
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Debt-servicing continues to impede sustainable use and conservation of biodiversity
With the globalisation of financial markets, capital has become more free,
resulting in “surges” of capital flow to developing countries, stopping and starting
as crises emerge. Alongside the periodic crises of public accounts produced by tidal
flows and ebbs of “hot money”,76 there has been an enormous growth in debt loads
all over developing countries (see Figure 3). Estimates of developing countries’ debt
are around USD 11 trillion, with debt service estimated at USD 3.9 trillion annually.
This figure dwarfs official CBD projections on the costs of stabilising biodiversity
loss (estimated at USD 895)77, although the precise mechanisms for achieving that
stabilisation must continue to evolve and be subject to debate based on new
evidence regarding both effectiveness and equity issues. Over the last decade, debt
service has comprised an increasing share of developing countries’ expenditures as
low-interest rates in developed countries, coupled with a sluggish recovery from
the 2008 financial crisis, prompted well capitalised lenders to send capital to
developing countries. Developing countries’ average debt payments as a proportion
of GDP more than doubled between 2008 and 2017.78 While increased access to
funds for developing countries is imperative to achieve all manner of environmental
and social priorities, it has come at the cost of spiralling debt service.
Figure 3: Debt service costs were already on the upswing pre-COVID-19.
Developing world only.75
75 Jubilee Debt Campaign, 2019.
76 Alami, 2019.
77 Convention on Biological Diversity, 2020c.
78 Jubilee Debt Campaign, 2020.
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The Jubilee Debt Campaign found that, between 2010 and 2019, developing
countries’ debt service payments grew by 85%, now comprising more than 12% of
all developing world government expenditure.79 Furthermore, low-income countries
have small domestic lender bases, so the vast bulk of borrowing is foreign-
denominated, making borrowing nations vulnerable to developed countries’
monetary policy change and reliant on foreign currency to make payments. The
need to acquire foreign currency to service debt incentivises exports that can bring
in international reserve currencies, particularly extractive commodities.80 In turn,
the 2014 commodity crash pushed exporters into further debt as demand collapsed,
significantly restricting public spending in many countries that are dependent on
raw material exports, hold foreign-denominated debt, and are home to high-risk
areas of significant biodiversity.
Figure 4: “Hot money” contributes to developing countries’ macroeconomic
instability, which contributes to poor biodiversity outcomes81
What’s at stake in all this debt? One might describe our contemporary political
economy as a debt-peonage society, where even in times of financial crises debt-
holders make out just fine while debtors shoulder the pain; developed countries’
governments and international institutions bail out the owners of capital, leaving
the realised risks to the less powerful and most vulnerable.82 This cycle of private
79 Jubilee Debt Campaign, 2019.
80 Ibid.
81 Jubilee Debt Campaign, 2020, building on UNCTAD statistics.
82 Gallagher & Kozul-Wright, 2019; Krugman, 2005.
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debt has been termed “privatized Keynesianism”.83 That is, unlike Keynesianism that
staves off crises with public finance, private financiers are emboldened to take
evermore risky positions by developed countries’ governments’ track record of
bailing out asset owners, creating speculative bubbles. In the subsequent crash,
when private finance becomes scarce, private debt becomes unpayable. Then, enter
stage left: bailout. As Gallagher and Kozul-Wright explain, “one of the lessons is
that we need more true public capital and less reliance on promiscuous private
capital.”84 This is also true of the international debt system, where private debt was
the catalyst for the 1980s debt crisis, and which could credibly form the cornerstone
of the next crisis.85
While private lending became a smaller proportion of developing world
external debt during the era of structural adjustment, its proportion has been
creeping up again as excess liquidity and quantitatively-eased financial markets scour
the world for yield. These yields are often found in extraction, which then go untaxed
as profits routed through secrecy jurisdictions or simply undertaxed by home
governments, further driving and justifying austerity. More concretely, rising levels
of debt service are directly related to falling domestic spending. In 10 of the 15
countries with the highest debt service payments, per capita public spending fell
between 2016 and 2018; conversely, among the 15 countries with the lowest debt
service, public spending rose by 11% across the group and fell in only two.86
Given the potential for even small additional state appropriations to have big
biodiversity impacts, the siphoning of state revenues to service debt leads to poor
environmental outcomes. Indeed, higher levels of debt have been linked to greater
levels of biodiversity loss. A study by Shandra et al. concluded that both debt service
and structural adjustment were significantly related to greater threats to mammal
and bird species.87 The explanation is straightforward – higher levels of debt mean
a greater need for countries to increase exports to service debt, particularly foreign-
denominated debt, which often means the intensification of agricultural or other
kinds of extraction for export that, perversely, further threatens biodiversity loss.
For example, Bolivia underwent the “shock therapy” of the IMF and World Bank,
requiring them to undertake “currency devaluations; road construction; export tax
rebates; reduction of import taxes; and suppression of price controls”, all meant to
attract national and international investment.88 Policies were enacted to increase
export earnings needed to facilitate loan repayment, which led to the increase of
83 Crouch 2011, discussed in Gallagher & Kozul-Wright 2019.
84 Gallagher & Kozul-Wright, 2019, p. 15.
85 Plender, 2020.
86 Jubilee Debt Campaign, 2020
87 Shandra et al., 2010.
88 Redo, 2011, p. 231.
35
foreign actors, particularly in agriculture. Critically, the effect was an increase in
deforestation and unequal land distribution.89 Chile also experienced rapid growth
of export-oriented forestry after its forests were privatised and all export restrictions
lifted, and there are links between these policy changes and the loss of old growth
forests with widespread conversion to plantation forestry,90 with similar outcomes
reported in Indonesia and Cameroon.91
Even in light of the challenging economic situations in which countries around
the world find themselves, economic recovery and improved conservation measures
are realisable with just a bit more imagination and solidarity than reverting to
austerity-as-usual. As Jayati Ghosh recently put it, “Covid-19 has made one thing
clear: Internationalism is not a luxury. It is a necessity.”92 This internationalism must
reckon with the entrenched logics of austerity and the institutions that solidify
discourses of fiscal rectitude, but the intersection of our various crises – economic
and environmental – is an opportunity to use evidence-based policy that can start
to contend with the results of previous policy mistakes. For example, rather than
insist on debt-repayment driven by export earnings from extractive industries, debt-
forgiveness is increasingly recognised as sound policy for achieving SDGs, and, we
suggest, CBD objectives and decisions.93 Debt cancellation may have all manner of
salutary impacts, improving countries’ balance sheets to free up investment in
conservation, improving infrastructure and services that reduce dependence on
extraction, and improve the enforcement of environmental regulations. Besides
debt-cancellation being a sound policy position, the contemporary norm that debt
must always be repaid by indebted states is contested by the legal concept of “odious
debt”, which claims that a debt is illegitimate “if the debt was incurred (1) without
the consent of the people, and (2) not for their benefit”.94 Legal scholarship thus
also calls into question the normative foundation on which creditor claims rest.95
But debt cancellation is not enough. In the short term, debt relief will be
important, as will providing crucial funding to public health systems, which could
include environmental protection as a holistic component of human well-being – a
critical intervention given the zoonotic origin of COVID-19 and the potential for
more diseases to jump to humans as habitats continue to shrink.96  In the medium
term, the global financial and aid systems will require wholesale reckoning with
austerity and rules governing investment and trade if biodiversity targets, or indeed
the SDGs more broadly, are to be met. But despite internationalism evidently being
89 See Hecht, 2005; Redo, 2011.
90 See Liverman & Vilas, 2006; Clapp, 1998.
91 Kaimowitz et al., 1998.
92 Ghosh, 2020.
93 UNCTAD, 2019.
94 Lienau, 2014, p. 8.
95 For a broader discussion of illegitimate debt, see Hanlon, 2002.
96 Tollefson, 2020
36
a necessity, as of now, the IMF’s attempts to deal with debt for highly indebted
countries in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic seem to be locking countries into
yet another lost decade of austerity.97
Debt-for-nature swaps?
Debt-for-nature swaps (DNS) are agreements where donors (governments,
organisations, or a combination of private and public) reduce a highly-indebted
country’s debt burden in return for some conservation/sustainable action on the part
of the debtor nation. The funds generated have typically been used to establish,
maintain, and monitor protected areas.98 The majority of these swaps took place in
the 1990s but have nearly ceased after their peak in 1993.
97 Munevar, 2020.
98 Deacon & Murphy, 1997.
99 Sheikh, 2018. The author notes that some debt transactions during this time period may not be represented
in this figure due to limited data available from international sources and organisations.
100 Sheikh, 2018.
Figure 5: Total number of Debt-for-Nature Swaps 1987-201599
Several factors account for this decline. For commercial debts involving third parties
(such as Conservation International, TNC, and the World Wildlife Fund), this is likely
due to declining costs of debt servicing. One researcher speculates that these declining
costs may be tied to the end of the Brady Plan which allowed highly indebted countries
partial debt forgiveness if the remaining debt were restructured as bonds that could
be traded on securities markets.100 When the programme ended, the price of debt
went up while financial leverage decreased and conservation organisations chose to
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explore different financial instruments. The same researcher accounts for the decline
of the United States’ involvement in DNS as stemming from a change in appropriations.
Prior to 1991, no appropriations were necessary to cancel debt, however, the Federal
Credit Reform Act of 1990 required the use of Net Present Value (NPV) in calculating
future swaps. Meanwhile shifting US policy emphasis (away from deforestation) meant
that relatively greater amounts of debt could be cancelled through other programmes,
like the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. The HIPC, created by the
World Bank and IMF, offered more favourable rates to debtors willing to undertake
austerity measures.101 In this context, the policy that the US uses to make these swaps,
the Tropical Forest Protection Act, was dormant from 2014 until its re-authorisation in
2019. This impact can likely be seen internationally as well, where no bilateral DNS
agreements were reached between 2007 and 2012.
Recent reviews indicate that the US government is responsible for 64% of all
debt forgiveness from these swaps, cancelling the debt of over USD 1.9 billion in low-
and middle-income nations, and generating USD 550 million for conservation.102 Other
developed nations are responsible for USD 1 billion of debt, generating about USD
500 million for conservation purposes.103 While the amount of sovereign debt retired
by creditor nations may appear large, the amount of commercial debt retired has
been relatively small. One researcher notes that even during their peak the overall
volume of trade in commercial debt was small, totalling USD 134 million between
1987-1997.104 The same research group also concludes that it is unclear if these swaps
represent new and additional funding, or involve donor countries shifting their funds
around, a point made in a UNDP overview of DNS.105
Although the DNS heyday has passed, there is growing interest in these mechanisms
and new experimentation, such as the USD 21.6 million deal struck by The Nature
Conservancy and the Seychelles.106
How well have swaps worked? It’s difficult to know in the aggregate. A recent UNDP
document states: “It is impossible to provide a detailed account of DNS [debt for nature
swaps] due to patchy information.”107 The literature that does exist suggests mixed
outcomes. One recent review focused on the US transactions suggests there is a
correlation with reduced deforestation.108 Other studies point to short-term gains, such
as improvement of local capacity to manage forest resources, followed by declines
once the funding generated from the swap ended.109 This latter point about lack of
101 Cassimon et al., 2011; Ruiz, 2007; Sheikh, 2009; Sheikh, 2018.
102 Cassimon et al., 2011; Sheikh, 2018.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Cassimon et al., 2011; United Nations Development Programme, 2017.
106 Silver & Campbell, 2018.
107 United Nations Development Programme, 2017.
108 Sommer et al., 2020.
109 Gockel & Gray, 2011.
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continuity and also limited monitoring of results is also made in a 2006 review article.110
Cassimon et al. closely examined swaps between the US and Indonesia, noting the
difficulty of assessing the impact of the USD 22 million total transactions. They suggest
that these swaps lacked incorporation into government structures and conclude that
due to the small amount of debt forgiven compared to the size of Indonesia’s debt
load, it had little impact on the need for Indonesia to advance extractive development
to meet debt obligations.111
Several studies and overviews question the complexity of these instruments,
with some pointing to how they duplicate institutions which monitor and administer
funds, and can increase the role of international or non-domestic actors in natural
resource or environmental decision-making.112 The latter stems from new trust funds
that can be established to manage the new funds, which often include board members
from outside organisations. This same point is raised in a recent review of the Seychelles
deal, where a trust fund established to manage funds includes The Nature Conservancy
(TNC). Given their role in the swap and in the trust fund, TNC has come to have a large
role in the planning and implementation of a marine spatial plan for the country’s
entire exclusive economic zone (EEZ).113 This Seychelles swap, the same researchers
note, allows the Government of Seychelles to “meet its IMF debt-to-GDP benchmarks
and show itself to be a proactive player in its own economic future”. But connecting
the dots, the researchers argue that the result is “the entirety of the Seychelles’ EEZ
has been enrolled as both subject to, and an asset in, macroeconomic restructuring; a
stronger hand for neoliberal logics, institutions, and property arrangements in its
governance has no doubt been secured”.114 In sum, these authors suggest there is a
real risk that these kinds of deals push countries to give up sovereignty over their
natural resources because of the imperative to lower their debts.
If there is a growing new wave of DNS on the horizon, there is also the question
of the monetary valuation of the nature part of the swap. Silver and Campbell undertake
a kind of thought experiment, noting that a conservative estimate of the economic
value of the ecosystem services supposedly protected by the TNC-Seychelles deal comes
in around USD 52.5 million. Yet the entire debt swap deal totalled only USD 21.6 million.
If these deals result in reductions in national control, and they truly are delivering
global biodiversity benefits, it appears that the Seychelles may have let their resources
go far too cheap.115
110 Reilly, 2006.
111 Cassimon et al., 2011.
112 Cassimon et al., 2011; UNDP, 2017; Silver & Campbell, 2018.
113 Silver and Campbell, 2018. As noted by other researchers, this debt swap involved a marine spatial plan
where artisanal fishers were not adequately represented. See Schutter & Hicks, 2019.
114 Silver & Campbell, 2018, p. 250.
115 Silver & Campbell, 2018.
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2.2 Inequity-reinforcing policies, corporate-focused trade rules, and
investment policies further entrench drivers of biodiversity loss
Introduction
If austerity is one of the key ideological and policy underpinnings of the
operation of the global economy that has significant ramifications for the
achievement of the Aichi targets, the other structural economic pillar is the policy
and practical preference for “free trade” and free-roaming capital investment. Under
the Washington consensus (or neoliberal consensus), enabling norms and rules
allowed footloose financial firms and corporations to invest freely around the globe,
expanding investment in extractivist activities in developing countries focused on
mineral and fossil fuel extraction, monocultural agricultural expansion, forestry and
fisheries operations, all of which are known direct drivers of biodiversity loss.116
Indeed, one set of researchers call the large corporations that control much of the
supply chains “keystone actors of the Anthropocene”, meaning like keystone species
in ecosystems, these companies play a dominant role in shaping contemporary
socioecologies.117 In what follows we explore how trade, investment rules, and
extractivism intersect with ongoing biodiversity loss and the difficulty of
implementing CBD decisions.
Key points
• International trade and the free movement of commodities and capital are
critical drivers of biodiversity loss
• Focus on comparative advantages and export of primary commodities, even
when entangled with the green economy, continues extractivism and uneven
geographical development
• Racialised, gendered, and wealth inequalities fuel extractivism and exacerbate
domestic and international ecological debts
International trade and the free movement of commodities and capital are critical
drivers of biodiversity loss
Global investment and trade, and the rules that govern it, have a significant
relationship to biodiversity. Trade agreements, whether bilateral, regional, plurilateral
or multilateral, have continued to proliferate over the last two decades and continue
to be actively sought by states.118 These agreements not only ramp up protections
for private investors (for example by conferring rights for foreign investors to directly
sue host governments in secretive private arbitration for legitimate measures to
116 IPBES, 2019.
117 Österblom et al., 2015.
118 Maluck et al., 2018.
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protect biodiversity and the environment) but also can effectively privatise conditions
of production. A prime example of this is the expansion of trade agreements to
include intellectual property rights (IPRs) (the international minimum standard being
the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) to
include parts of nature, like microorganisms. This has led to increased incentives
for misappropriation of genetic resources, or “biopiracy”, without fair and equitable
benefit-sharing, directly undermining the third objective of the CBD.119
And while the era of big regional or global trade agreements seems to have
stalled after the Doha Round of WTO negotiations, this masks the rise of bilateral
free trade agreements between either a developed and a developing country or
developed countries’ trade blocs to developing countries. These bilateral trade deals
put developing countries at a significant negotiating disadvantage, often advancing
an environmental race to the bottom. There have been some efforts to add
biodiversity protections into trade deals, but the fact remains that chapters like
investment or intellectual property tend to take precedence (legally and politically)
over environmental or sustainable development chapters in FTAs. There is also
evidence that enforcement of those sustainability provisions varies radically, for
example, between US and EU treaties.120
On top of this, free trade agreements actively incorporate investor protection
mechanisms, such as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) or the recently
introduced investment court system (ICS). Investor protection mechanisms enable
transnational corporations to sue a state if it introduces legislation that may lead to
lost profits for the multinational corporation. This threat of a lawsuit can thus lead
states to not introduce ambitious environmental legislation.121
Global trade and investment agreements enable money to traverse the globe
in secret. Countries in Africa miss out on more than USD 50 billion from multinational
corporations each year in avoided tax – taxes that could be put to use as public
investments (for example, to address the drivers of biodiversity loss).122 Merely
capturing a fraction of this untaxed revenue would provide important domestic
funds for pursuing self-determined priorities rather than being tethered to external
donor goals, giving country-ownership. In an age of hyperglobalisation for capital,
secrecy jurisdictions and tax havens also play a more direct role in ecological
overdraw. As Galaz et al. put it, tax havens “provide bad actors with opportunities
to avoid financial scrutiny, reducing the impact of policies such as certification or
supply chain monitoring. A recent study of tax havens found that 70% of known
119 Information on biopiracy can be found in Hammond, 2013; Hammond, 2014; further discussions on the
relationship between digital sequencing and biopiracy can be found in Hammond, 2017; Laird and Wynberg,
2018.
120 Meyer, 2018.
121 Eberhardt, 2016; Khor, 2018.
122 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2015.
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fishing vessels implicated in illegal fishing are flagged in a tax haven, and that nearly
70% of foreign capital linked to the largest companies raising soy and beef in the
Amazon, prime drivers of deforestation, were channeled through tax havens.”123
The outcome of hyperglobalisation: wealth inequalities and super-charged
extraction
Much of what has transpired in the last few decades validates the concerns of
the anti or alter-globalisation movements of the 1990s as trade rules have eroded
sovereignty, weakened environmental and labour laws, and contributed to galloping
inequality.124 These concerns were expressed at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit where
the CBD was created, as civil society expressed fears about a race to the bottom
and expanded development without standardised, international rules or regulations
able to protect people and nature. And indeed the resulting flows of capital since
Rio accelerated global environmental problems like climate change and biodiversity
loss, while exacerbating inequalities. As one recent United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report puts it, “The problem is that while trade
and investment flows have mushroomed under hyperglobalization, the package of
accompanying policies, including special processing zones and massive subsidies to
attract multinationals, offered by developing countries to encourage processing
trade and by local communities in advanced countries desperate to attract jobs,
has brought limited (economic) benefits.”125 While some growth has alleviated
extreme poverty, the bottom 50% of the global income earners captured only 12%
of growth between 1980-2016, while the top 1% captured 27%, and virtually all of
the gains made by poor people were achieved in China. This radically uneven
geography of economic growth has left most people, especially those in HIPCs,
entirely excluded from whatever material and social benefits offered by expanded
production and consumption.126 Much of this inequitable growth is predicated on
limited or under-enforced environmental law and policy.127
Trade and investment – and the agreements that govern them – continue
patterns of ecological debt outlined in Part 1 of this report. The overall goal of
these agreements is to push economic growth, with limited concern for its costs.
As a recent UNCTAD report states, “Growth has become dependent on punishing
levels of debt and a pace of resource extraction and energy consumption that is
threatening the survival of the planet itself.”128 The hyperglobalisation of capital is
linked to biodiversity loss because, even as volumes of trade and attendant financial
123 Galaz et al., 2018.
124 Mander & Goldsmith, 1996; Klein, 1999; Klein, 2007.
125 Gallagher & Kozul-Wright, 2019, p. 19.
126 Hickel, 2017.
127 United Nations Environment Programme, 2019.
128 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2019, p. 6.
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flows have grown dramatically over the last 40 years, the material stuff that is traded
continues to be dominated by raw or intermediate materials. The leading material
exports for better than 75% of countries fall into these categories. Only East Asia,
as a region, has finished goods as top material exports; in Sub-Saharan Africa and
Latin America, virtually every country’s exports are led by raw materials, either
agricultural or mineral.129 Scholars in Latin America characterise the region as going
through a “reprimarization” of their economies over the past few decades.130
The case of invasive species
One of the ways trade causes damage to biodiversity is through the increased risk of
invasives. This is, of course, not a new phenomenon, as the importation of invasives that
damage local ecologies was a critical, if not always intentional, feature of colonial
exploration, exploitation, and trade.131 As the rules on trade have become less restrictive
and global trade volumes have exploded over the last 30 years, Potter and Urquhart note
that “the resulting unprecedented mixing of species across continents and ecosystems is
surely one of the most profound manifestations of the Anthropocene”.132 Illustrating this
point, it is no coincidence that the USA, being highly interconnected through both volume
of trade and geographical diversity of trade linkages, is both the largest net sender and
recipient of invasive species.133 However, the threats posed by invasives are highly
differentiated across scales and depending on the nature of the invasive. Developed
countries are more likely to have resources and expertise for sophisticated bio-surveillance
regimes, while developing countries, with fewer resources but increasingly interconnected
into global trade networks, will face increased, but less well mitigated risks.134 What is
consistent across world regions, however, is the role of material trade practices, and in
turn, the rules that govern them, in facilitating the spread of invasives. These threats are
already responsible for significant biodiversity loss globally; for example, as much as a
quarter of South African biodiversity loss is due to invasives.135 Meanwhile, global
agreements that are directly related to trade and biodiversity tend to focus on restricting
traffic in endangered species, often involving militarised, violent enforcement in
biodiversity-rich, cash-poor communities, a troubling fixation that is mirrored in bilateral
ODA that focuses on enforcement rather than addressing drivers.136 These compacts are
focused on regulating very narrow types of trade in a handful of designated species, but
do little to nothing to confront the drivers of the trade in those species, much less the
broader political economic drivers of biodiversity loss, including trade itself.
129 UNCTAD, 2019b.
130 Brand et al., 2016.
131 Hulme, 2009.
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“The financial sector is bankrolling the mass extinction crisis, while undermining
human rights and indigenous sovereignty”
Financialisation, including international investment into farmland trusts and
the expansion of agricultural futures markets, is increasingly implicated in the
expansion of intensive, industrial agriculture and attendant biodiversity loss.137
Development banks keep pumping money into environmentally damaging
agribusinesses.138 One recent study found that high-profile banks like Goldman Sachs,
JP Morgan, Bank of America, and Morgan Stanley are implicated in financing
deforestation by delivering debt and equity financing to agribusiness to the tune of
USD 44 billion.139 Another report found that 50 of the world’s largest banks had
levels of biodiversity risk valued at USD 52 billion, on average. Adding it all up, these
banks are underwriting more than USD 2.6 trillion into sectors known to be the
drivers of biodiversity loss. This, they note, is an amount equivalent to Canada’s
GDP.140 The report concludes, “The financial sector is bankrolling the mass extinction
crisis, while undermining human rights and indigenous sovereignty.”141
What’s the answer? As the authors of the above report succinctly state, “[T]o
prevent extinction, banks have to stop funding it.” Yet, the emphasis since at least
Rio has been on voluntary “regulation”, a point we take up in section 3.4. Why
voluntary given the outsized impact of the sector? In part it is because the financial
sector is highly concentrated with a similarly outsized influence on international
and national policy. As Reyes writes, “A key part of the problem lies in the structure
of the banking system itself, in which power is concentrated in the hands of large
‘too big to fail’ banks”, who have only consolidated their power since the 2008
financial crisis.142 And they have used this power to impede reforms to their sector.143
More broadly, Piketty has clearly shown that holders of capital – particularly
the most wealthy with the means to participate in the extension of debt or equity –
tend to accumulate wealth more quickly than the economy grows. So the actors
tied up in finance and the institutions themselves shore up their wealth and thus
often power and influence over time, a concentration that is made easier without
strong international tax regimes.144 This influence has been exacerbated by trade
and investment agreements, which have raised the bargaining power of capital
compared to labour, “allowing corporations to repress wages and working conditions
in both developed and developing countries”.145 The contemporary international
137 McElwee, 2020, p. 9.
138 Wasley & Heal, 2020.
139 Global Witness, 2019.
140 Portfolio Earth, 2020, p. 6.
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relations dynamic is one where “territorial power of strong states” is “intertwined
with the extra-territorial power of footloose capital”, a configuration that Kozul-
Wright describes as a “mercantilist jungle” inimical to necessary multilateralism.
Capital is simply doing what prevailing political economic norms & states want it
to do: expand the world economy
Banks, investors, trade and investment agreements are essentially achieving
what they are set up to do: expand the world economy. The World Trade Organization
(WTO)’s own research shows that trade and investment agreements tend to increase
carbon dioxide emissions that underpin the climate crisis and are often coincident
with biodiversity loss.146 This is a finding whose effects are confirmed by more recent
research by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), which concludes
that “90 percent of biodiversity loss and water stress are caused by resource
extraction and processing”.147 The authors find that, to achieve some stabilisation,
there must be “absolute reductions in per capita resource use in developed
countries”,148 a finding which runs counter to the rules of engagement that currently
govern international trade, and the global economy as a whole, which focus intently
on expansion.
A review paper published in 2020 shows that economic growth, full stop, is
implicated in biodiversity loss, through increased trade and resource use which
leads to both land-use change, invasive species increases and climate change.149
The same paper demonstrates that increased resource efficiency, or what is known
as “decoupling” of GDP from resource use, is yet to occur on a scale and scope that
can attenuate global environmental impacts and is unlikely to do so (barring massive
technological innovation). Yet major global environment and development policies
tend to still take an “unreflexive growth emphasis”, an emphasis the review authors
say stands in the way of “safeguarding biodiversity”.150
While the reactionary response to the deleterious effects of free-floating trade
and capital can be (and has been) isolationism, there is enormous room to produce
a renewed multilateralism, a progressive internationalism able to foster solidarity
across vast geographies. Any such reform, as a recent UNCTAD report states in
relation to the climate action, “must ensure the maximum space to undertake
financial regulations and debt workouts (...) policies for social welfare that are in
line with the demands for a global green new deal, including the effective use of
146 Gallagher & Kozul-Wright, 2019, citing WTO-UNEP 2009 Trade and Climate Change report, p. 22.
147 United Nations Environment Programme, 2019b, p 27.
148 Ibid., p.95
149 Otero et al., 2020.
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subsidies to support structural transformation and the development of alternative
energies and to re-engineer the production process of carbon-intensive
industries”.151 It is not a stretch to add biodiversity to this line of thinking.
Focus on comparative advantages and export of primary commodities, even when
entangled with the green economy, continues extractivism and uneven
geographical development
The underlying theory that has driven the free trade agenda harkens back to
outdated, discredited theories of development, particularly comparative advantage
and linear paths to development.152 “Free” trade undermines local industry as
resources flow to established or protected manufacturing centres, and value-adding
processes are concentrated in those centres of production. This leads to the lock-in
of old manufacturing processes and ensures that exporters of raw materials remain
dependent on those activities, limiting opportunities for economic diversification
away from extraction, even in a “green” form. Unequal terms of trade, as well as
dependency on countries with financial hegemony, severely limits development
strategies based on classical economic theories like “comparative advantage”.153 As
McAfee summarises, “No country in history has ever advanced up the international
economic ladder by exporting primary commodities on ‘free market’ terms. Genetic
resource primary commodities are no different in this respect.”154
As McAfee gestures to with genetic resources, the dangers of a development
strategy focused on the export of primary commodities are crucial to keep in mind
in the current green energy boom, too. The imperative to increase raw material
exports, often at the expense of ecosystems, will not be alleviated by the switch to
“greener” technologies in developed countries, but instead often move to new,
fragile ecosystems. For example, countries with significant lithium reserves are
already signing bilateral export deals with battery-manufacturing countries, where
the vast majority of the value will be added to finished products.155 The same is true
of rare earth minerals critical to the production of various “smart” consumer and
industrial goods. In both cases, and countless others, the rules of global trade and
geographies of consumption, expenditure and finance make it virtually impossible
for resource-extracting countries to develop the infrastructure, technology, or
adjacent industrial sectors to add value to their own raw materials, engendering a
new circuit through which ecological debt accrues. Now, a push to the foreground
NBS that makes responses to environmental crises primarily a matter of shifting
151 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2019a, p. 30.
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land use in developing countries threatens to reinscribe the logic of comparative
advantage that once led former World Bank president Lawrence Summers to declare
that Africa was “underpolluted”.156 That is, rather than do the more challenging
work of reducing the material throughput of developed, consumption-based
economies, the onus will fall on the still-biodiverse developing countries to make
significant and difficult changes because it is the “least-cost” solution.
The extraction of these new resources for ostensibly green technologies and
products has profound local biodiversity impacts, from hypersalinity in Chilean lakes
that destroys habitat for endangered migratory birds157 to riparian damage and forest
loss in sensitive ecosystems from both artisanal and large-scale coltan mining in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.158 In each of these cases, and myriad others –
from cut flowers in Kenya to oil palm in Indonesia – little of these biodiversity-
adverse resources are upgraded or consumed locally. It is only through systems of
international trade that wealthy nations can function as centres of demand at such
a destructive scale. As developing countries are facing soaring debt levels in the
face of the COVID-19 pandemic, the IMF has once again stepped in to demand
fiscal consolidation.159 Such austerity measures will structurally limit government
spending in developing countries. A result of this is that these countries will be
unable to invest in ambitious economic strategies that would otherwise be able to
present an alternative to primary commodity production.
In summary, rather than pursuing biological diversity as yet another set of
commodities ripe for export-led growth, we turn again to the insights of Gallagher
and Kozul-Wright:
“The rules and practices of multilateral trade, investment and monetary regime are in
need of urgent reform. The rules are currently skewed in favour of financial and
corporate interests, and powerful countries, leaving national governments, local
communities, households and future generations to bear the costs of economic
insecurity, rising inequality, financial instability, and climate change. The rules of the
global trade and investment regime have been instrumental in delivering this
unbalanced outcome.... The most effective efforts will be those that recognize the
systemic nature of the challenge, rather than piecemeal policy tinkering.”160
Yet, even policy tinkering is rare. Despite the role these sectors and their
enabling “rules” play in perpetuating ecological decline, many efforts to reign in
corporate and financial impacts have been voluntary.161 The  “economic efficiency”
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promised by theories of comparative advantage (often promoted by international
trade economists) not only represents negative externalities, but existential threats
to nature, and as the next subsection argues, human life itself.
Racialised, gendered, and wealth inequalities fuel extractivism and exacerbate
domestic and international ecological debts
While the problem of economic development and biodiversity conservation
is often narrated as a trade-off between reducing poverty or reducing the impact
on nature, the real story is much more complex. Who benefits and who bears the
costs of extractivism matters, not only to identify who is negatively impacted, or to
calculate national ecological debts, but because inequalities – along gender, racial,
and wealth lines – can  fuel extractivism, and thus fuel biodiversity loss and rights
abuses.
This is perhaps made most clear by the UN Special Rapporteur on
contemporary forms of racism, Ms E Tendayi Achiume, who in 2019 released an
official report on the subject of global extractivism and racial inequality.162 The report
reaffirms what many communities have experienced for a very long time: the
extractivist economy – ranging from mining and fossil fuels to large-scale forestry
and industrial agriculture – is deadly. The report summarises: “Powerful States and
their transnational corporations, and the political elites of weaker States that are
territories of extraction, emerge as the clear winners. The populations of those
territories of extraction bear the brunt of the extractivism economy, too often paying
with their very lives.”163 And these impacts are far from evenly felt, with
contemporary models of “extraction that rely upon or produce racial, ethnic, and
Indigenous exploitation” that tend to perpetuate colonial inequalities, a point made
by another UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya,
in a 2012 report.164 Rapporteur Tendayi Achiume links her research to the earlier
work of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, Rashida Manjoo, by
highlighting the intersectional effects of extraction, with gender as a crucial axis:
women living near extractive projects experience “increased workload...exclusions
from consultations, and violations of sexual and reproductive rights”.165 The study
also notes that women lack access to waged employment in the sector, with
contractors and companies preferring to hire men. Patriarchy, Tendayi Achiume
concludes, “operates within and through” extraction.
162 Tendayi Achiume, 2019. In defining extractivism Tendayi Achiume draws from Brand et al., “the predominance
of economic activities that are primarily based on resource extraction and the nature valorization without
distributive politics” (p. 4).
163 Ibid. p. 2.
164 Quote from Tendayi Achiume, 2019, p. 10, 14-19; Anaya, 2012.
165 Tendayi Achiume, p. 18.
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The international evidence compiled by Rapporteurs Manjoo, Tendayi
Achiume, and Anaya illustrates the insights of feminist, Indigenous and Black scholars
of economic development and capitalism: negative outcomes from economic
development processes, falling too often along racial and gender lines, are not only
outcomes or the results of extractivism, but rather constitutive of them.166 As Sami
scholar Rauna Kuokkanen explains, systems of oppression and economic processes
of economic development “come into existence through each other”.167 Naomi Klein
connects these widespread systemic social processes like racism and sexism to
environmental degradation: these systems of oppression are not only an outcome
of extractivist processes, but also legitimise extractivist developments.168
Gendered, racialised, and colonial hierarchies – the societal production of some
as more or less human, or as more or less important – cannot be dissociated from
ecological crisis, as those systemic hierarchies render some people and species more
sacrificial than others, more available to be poisoned, or to have their land and
communities polluted or extracted from. What this research and analysis bring to
the fore is the role that systemic racism, sexism, and class divisions play not only in
perpetuating wealth inequalities (within and between countries) but also in
perpetuating extractivism and thus biodiversity loss. With these drivers of
biodiversity loss in mind, one can consider anti-racism, decolonial, and feminist
movements crucial planks of biodiversity strategies, even if they don’t directly
address issues of ecological change.
2.3 Biodiversity finance is outpaced by harmful subsidies that are
challenging to identify and reform
Introduction
Reforming subsidies is a major plank of the proposed resource mobilisation
component of the post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF), demonstrating
a growing awareness that stopping the outsized public finance perpetuating
biodiversity loss “would serve to reduce biodiversity finance needs in the long-term”
by slowing biodiversity loss at the source.169 Hence, addressing this issue properly
is critical. The CBD defines harmful subsidies as “government action that confers an
advantage to consumers or producers (…) but in doing so, discriminates against
sound environmental practices”.170 These subsidies are widespread and incentivise
practices that accelerate biodiversity loss, while also pushing industries past a
sustainable limit for the long-term continuation of their economic activities. Despite
166 See for example, Incite! (Eds.), 2006; Pulido, 2016; Melamud, 2015.
167 Kuokkanen, 2008.
168 Klein, 2016.
169 Ibid., p. 13.
170 Convention on Biological Diversity, 2018, p. 5.
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a growing consensus among international political and economic organisations that
these subsidies must be reformed, perennial government commitments remain
unfulfilled. The CBD’s Aichi Target 3, for example, is still pending for most signatory
countries with only 19 out of 193 countries showing progress in this matter.171
Meanwhile, even conservative estimates of biodiversity-harming subsidies are
concerning: the OECD’s 2020 report estimated that the flow of subsidies potentially
harmful to biodiversity was in the order of USD 500 billion per year, an amount five
to six times greater than the monetary resources flowing toward conservation.172 A
resource mobilisation strategy that tries to keep pace with these flows rests on the
assumption that harmful industries can continue as long as there is adequate
additional capital to “protect” nature from these very impacts. This assumption
means that “many of the innovative instruments designed to arrest biodiversity
loss will categorically fail and, moreover, they will distract from the most needed
change”.173 As harmful subsidies are known to put biodiversity, as well as long-term
economic prospects, at risk, we must ask why it has been so challenging to stop
governments from giving the upper hand to destructive industries.
Key Points
• Research is needed in order to quantify how and where harmful subsidies are
flowing, as well as their eventual social and ecological impacts.
• Eliminating harmful flows of finance may include eliminating subsidies
altogether or reorganising subsidies so that their most harmful impacts are
disincentivised.
• The entrenched nature of subsidies and entanglements with powerful lobby
groups make them difficult to eliminate, even when they do not make long-
term economic or ecological sense.
• The benefit of subsidies tends to be captured unequally across class, race,
and gender, but undoing these programmes without alternatives may still
disproportionately impact marginalised communities.
Research is needed in order to quantify how and where these subsidies are flowing,
as well as their eventual social and ecological impacts
The beneficial or harmful outcomes of subsidies remain obscured and hard to
track, in part due to a lack of publicly available and transparent data. Data on
subsidies released to the public may also be incomplete by not accounting for tax-
based subsidies, subsidies for infrastructure, or other costs absorbed by the state.174
171 Convention on Biological Diversity, 2018.
172 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2020a, p. 3.
173 Bigger et al., 2019, p. 9.
174 Corkal et al., 2020.
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Public funding for fossil fuels, for example, ranks “among the largest flows of public
finance potentially harmful to biodiversity”,175 yet estimates on the exact costs
incurred by the public vary. Global public financial support for fossil fuel consumption
and production subsidies was estimated at USD 478 billion in 2019.176 However,
these figures do not include estimations of delayed costs incurred from the extraction
and use of fossil fuels, many of which do eventually translate to public spending for
environmental clean-up, flood repair, emergency response, healthcare costs, and
so on. A 2015 report from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) attempted to put
a number to the true cost of these externalities and estimated the global annual
public cost of supporting fossil fuels to be closer to USD 4.7 trillion.177
Making these public expenditures transparent and legible is a necessary step
towards better accountability for stated government commitments to environmental
and social well-being. Yet improving disclosure is only the first necessary step. More
research is needed to specify, compare, and characterise the impact of these
subsidies, which would allow for a more comprehensive assessment of the extent
to which domestic budgets are aligned with climate and biodiversity objectives.
While we may have assumptions about which corporations and communities benefit
the most from harmful subsidies, understanding the specifics of this public finance
is crucial to subsidy reform. To use a term coined by Dempsey et al., we need
subsidies accountability, a research agenda that identifies which subsidies are
harming biodiversity, who benefits, and what policy alternatives will have the best
social and ecological outcomes.178 Understanding who captures the economic
advantage, and what practices are incentivised to do so, will be necessary for forming
any specific policy recommendations aiming to equitably turn off public finance
flows to drivers of biodiversity loss.
Eliminating harmful flows of finance may include eliminating subsidies altogether
or reorganising subsidies so that their impacts most harmful to biodiversity are
un-incentivised
Where subsidies research has taken place, one can point to which flows of
finance need to be most urgently turned off and repurposed. For example, with
regard to fisheries, Sumaila et al.’s research leads them to recommend the
elimination of “capacity-enhancing subsidies”, that is, subsidies that incentivise the
expansion of fisheries’ productive capacity, and instead reorient these subsidies to
support sustainable activities that improve overall ocean conditions (i.e. removing
plastics).179 We can take from this example that the structure of subsidies, rather
175 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2020a, p. 13.
176 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2020b.
177 Coady et al., 2019.
178 Dempsey et al., 2020.
179 Sumaila et al., 2016.
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than just dollar amounts of public funding to certain industries, may determine the
impacts upon immediate biodiversity loss or long-term sustainability. Undertaking
similar research, the OECD found that “In 2017, OECD countries alone provided
USD 228 billion in support to farmers, of which USD 116 billion (i.e. 51%) is
considered potentially most environmentally harmful compared to other types of
support.”180 Characterising subsidies with structures that incentivise environmentally
destructive behaviour may allow for more precision about how much money is
flowing to the most harmful subsidies. These analyses help make explicit which
“most harmful” subsidies within an industry should be eliminated, and which may
continue to benefit communities without harming biodiversity if their incentives
are reorganised. This kind of research on environmental outcomes of subsidies must
continue if we are to understand which subsidies most urgently need to be stopped.
It would also help us understand which communities – particularly vulnerable
communities – might be harmed by subsidy removal, facilitating the creation of
replacements or policies to reduce that harm.
The entrenched nature of subsidies and entanglements with powerful lobby groups
make them difficult to eliminate, even when they do not make long-term economic
or ecological sense
Understanding the environmental or economic impacts of subsidies alone does
not necessarily help to undo the political structures they are reliant on to continue.
In 1995, harmful subsidies were mentioned briefly in a CBD Decision from Jakarta,
which states: “The inclusion of subsidies was contentious. Some delegates stressed
that the issue of subsidies was politically sensitive, with potential trade
implications.”181 This sentiment is reflected in the literature on harmful subsidies,
which points to the important political roles they play across societies as one reason
they have been so hard to reform. Subsidies can be used as a means for a number
of political ends; to nurture re-election hopes, advance geopolitical goals, or quell
uprisings.182 While subsidies may have direct impacts on citizens who benefit, they
are also considered inefficient and short-sighted, especially as a means of addressing
poverty and inequality.
For example, a recent study found that 90% of capacity-building subsidies
known to deplete fisheries flow to large-scale fisheries: USD 17.8 billion of those
capacity-building subsidies go to large-scale fisheries while only USD 2.3 billion flow
to small-scale fisheries.183 The latter, of course, are crucial for supporting some of
the poorest communities, whereas the former serve large companies and those of
180 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2020a, p. 13.
181 Convention on Biological Diversity, 1995, p. 19.
182 Global Subsidies Initiative, 2011.
183 Schuhbauer, et al., 2017.
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us dining out on cheap sushi. Lobbying power is also a reason behind the tiny fraction
of fisheries subsidies given to small-scale fisheries worldwide.184 In Indonesia,
powerful interest groups organise to defend palm oil subsidies, and governments
are pushed to appease their backers.185 Likewise, the influence of the fossil fuel
sector on public policy is a well-known story. For example, over a five-year period,
the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers met with the Canadian federal
government 536 times, as opposed to six meetings with the national climate
coalition, influencing not only energy but climate and wider environmental policy.186
Making explicit how government subsidies tend to be advocated for and captured
by the wealthy – and what alternatives exist to secure livelihoods for marginalised
communities – may create space for the political will to eliminate or reform subsidies.
The benefit of subsidies tends to be captured unequally across class, race, and
gender, but undoing these programmes without alternatives may still
disproportionately impact marginalised communities
Subsidies that result in lower prices on goods such as fuel, electricity, and
food make it hard to untangle these subsidies from larger issues of inequality, even
if there are more efficient and progressive ways to capture public funds that do not
give an upper hand to destructive industries. Many consumer subsidies are
regressive, in that they disproportionately benefit those of middle or higher incomes;
one survey of 19 developing countries that employed petroleum subsidies between
the years 1993-2007 found that only 3% of the subsidy was captured by the lowest
quintile of household incomes, compared with 62% by the highest.187 However, in
cases such as this, it is also estimated that the removal of the subsidy would have
the greatest impact on those of the lowest incomes, especially women.188 Oscar
Reyes examines how subsidy reform may mask austerity measures under the guise
of environmentalism, and can have negative societal effects:
“Most of the subsidy reforms achieved in recent years have in fact fallen on the
consumer side, removing price limits that keep diesel or gasoline affordable ... Cutting
these subsidies tends to be regressive, because people with low incomes spend a
larger share of their income on energy than the rich do. To make matters worse, the
IMF has taken to hard-wiring fossil fuel subsidy reform into broader packages of
austerity, with Ecuador’s move to eliminate subsidies on diesel and gasoline the poster
child of this approach. This move had a predictable result: a political insurgency that
184 Pauly et al., 2003; Jacquet & Pauly, 2008.
185 Maxton-Lee, 2018.
186 Much of the evidence comes from investigative reporting and freedom of information requests. See: Yunker
& Daub, 2017; Linnet, 2012.
187 del Granado et al., 2012, cited in Kitson et al., 2016.
188 Kusumawardhani et al., 2020.
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has swept across the country. A similar condition in IMF lending to Egypt has also
sparked protests and worsened inequality in the country.”189
Instead of these measures, the public finance currently directed at subsidies
that benefit upper-income households could be repurposed for social assistance,
social services, or public infrastructure investments that benefit the lowest-income
households. For example, in 2015, Indonesia repurposed close to USD 1.6 billion
from removing gas and diesel subsidies, which was reinvested into social
programmes and infrastructure.190 Similar programmes have been underway in
Ghana and India.191 The Global Subsidies Initiative has begun the work of
understanding gender-based impacts of fossil fuel subsidies, and alternative ways
to support low-income women, but, as they note, there is little research out there
that examines this issue.192 More research on this topic, as well as other gendered
and racial inequities in subsidy distribution and impact, will be needed to understand
how harmful subsidies can be turned off and repurposed without further
disadvantaging marginalised communities.
189 Reyes, 2020, p. 128.
190 Pradiptyo et al., 2016.
191 Reyes, 2020.
192 International Institute for Sustainable Development, n.d.
54
The previous section lays out the broad, political economic conditions and policy
choices that continue to erode biodiversity. In light of global political economic
norms like austerity and the predominance of trade and investment interest over
public goods, governments, civil society, and international institutions pushed
voluntary measures to tame financial flows and development impacts, and advanced
what are termed innovative financial mechanisms, including payments for ecosystem
services (PES), private finance and blended finance. To what extent have private,
innovative/market-based, and voluntary financial/economic initiatives advanced the
implementation of the CBD?  What are the primary challenges? To what degree can
these support the broader transformative change called for by IPBES in 2019 and
for many decades by Indigenous, environmental justice, and social movements?
3.1 Market-oriented approaches, such as PES and REDD+, offer insufficient finance
and mixed results for biodiversity
3.2 Private investment in biodiversity-enhancing projects is small, geographically
constrained, and in a perpetual state of “proof of concept”
3.3 Blended finance is unlikely to deliver a sustainable future
3.4 Voluntary certification and disclosure schemes may have some impact, but
rarely on the scale necessary to halt biodiversity loss
3.1 Market-oriented approaches, such as PES and REDD+, offer insufficient
finance and mixed results for biodiversity
Introduction
Goal 4 of the CBD’s current strategy for resource mobilisation is focused on
exploring “new and innovative financial mechanisms”, including Payments for
Ecosystem Services (PES). PES programmes have been increasingly promoted in
the past few decades as a way of generating new sources of revenue for conservation
and compensating individuals and communities for the livelihood impacts of
conservation, with over 550 programmes worldwide.193 While each of the
Part 3
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193 Salzman et al., 2018.
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mechanisms under Goal 4 deserves attention, we focus on PES due to our specific
expertise, and also because there is a robust literature on, and a significant amount
of policy momentum behind, these programmes in locations around the world. In
addition, PES are often defined capaciously so as to include other mechanisms listed
under Goal 4, such as sustainable certification for green products and REDD+ projects
under the Kyoto Protocol.194
We define PES as direct payments or in-kind transfers to individual or collective
landholders that aim to incentivise, compensate, or reward land uses beneficial for
the production of pre-defined ecosystem services, including programmes such as
water funds and REDD+ that may not self-define as PES but in several instances
share the same characteristics. As an early iteration of market-based approaches to
conservation, the evidence on PES can offer insights for other innovative financial
mechanisms, such as the recent push for “nature-based solutions” (NbS), and
therefore inform the next resource mobilisation strategy.
We address the following three questions with regard to the track record of
PES for biodiversity conservation: (1) Have PES programmes been effective at
mobilising resources for biodiversity conservation? (2) What are the outcomes of
PES programmes with regard to biodiversity? (3) What factors contribute to positive
biodiversity outcomes in PES?
Key Points
• PES do not present a major new source of funding for biodiversity. The few
biodiversity-focused PES show narrow scope and uncertain results.
• In part because biodiversity is difficult to standardise and measure, monitoring
tends to be inconsistent and/or insufficient.
• When driven by user demand (the market), PES initiatives are vulnerable to
market fluctuations and tend to have an overly narrow focus on species and
solutions of direct interest to buyers.
• To support just and sustainable outcomes, PES programmes should harmonise
with existing values, knowledge systems, and institutions.
PES do not present a major new source of funding for biodiversity. The few
biodiversity-focused PES show narrow scope and uncertain results
According to the original, theoretical model, PES focus on a specific ecosystem
service or set of services that can be voluntarily purchased or subsidised by
downstream users who compensate service “providers” for ecosystem management
activities upstream thought to increase the production of ecosystem services. Based
on this model, creating markets, or market-like arrangements, between users and
194 Hein et al., 2013.
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providers of ecosystem services will provide access to new funding for conservation
and increase its efficiency as those paying will be highly motivated to ensure that
targets are achieved.
A review by Hein et al. addressed the effectiveness of PES as a resource
mobilisation strategy under the CBD.195 That review concluded that, while PES
sometimes served as a useful tool for advancing implementation, it was not sufficient
to address biodiversity funding needs. This review also found that employing PES
to achieve biodiversity conservation goals posed a number of problems concerning
the specific focus of programmes and the metrics used to monitor them, the
sustainability and reliability of finance, and the difficulty of valuing multiple
ecosystem services produced by a single landscape. While such programmes have
become ubiquitous for ecosystem services such as water quantity and quality,
carbon, erosion control, and even “scenic beauty”, PES for biodiversity “has been
slowest to take off, due largely to the typically low availability of financial support
for biodiversity conservation”.196
Although theorised as being funded by markets for ecosystem services, most
PES initiatives are government-funded or, similar to REDD+, financed through
“blended” or hybrid approaches. According to a 2018 review, there are 120 habitat
and biodiversity PES programmes globally, 86% (104) of which are compliance-driven
rather than buyer-driven.197 Belying the goals and focus of the PES model, this
indicates that such programmes rely on strong regulatory frameworks for protection
of biodiversity, and are not demand-driven. Biodiversity outcomes are more difficult
to “sell” and to measure in PES than ecosystem services such as water or carbon.
Unlike these ES, biodiversity is not easily standardisable and does not always have
clearly-defined beneficiaries or existing institutions governing its distribution (in
comparison to e.g. water utilities). In a review of the viability of PES as a strategy for
global biodiversity finance that responds to the 2008 CBD Resource Mobilization
Strategy, Hein et al. note:
“The complexity of ecosystem functioning is not easily transferred to market prices.
Ecosystem changes are subject to complex dynamics including thresholds and
irreversible changes... Consequently, there may be major variations in the societal
costs and benefits of preserving one additional unit of an ecosystem, depending on
the changes in ecological processes as a function of that change.”198
195 Hein et al., 2013.
196 Ingram et al., 2014, p. 10; see also Salzman et al., 2018; Wunder & Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2009.
197 Salzman et al., 2018, p. 138.
198 Hein et. al., 2013, p. 90.
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The few existing biodiversity-focused PES initiatives tend to focus only on
specific protected species or those of interest to users (buyers). The largest
biodiversity-related PES market – habitat mitigation banking mainly in developed
countries – has been criticised for prioritising narrow measures of “unbundled”
ecosystem functions that do not necessarily add up to holistic or sustainable habitat
preservation.199 Salzman et al. also note that data for the compliance mitigation
market for streams and wetlands is the “least transparent”, making global
transactions difficult to track.200 These transactions are estimated to be USD 2.5-
8.4 billion annually.201
As noted earlier in this document in relation to other financing sources, PES
for biodiversity has been hampered by the same lack of funding that limits other
strategies for biodiversity conservation, raising questions about its capacity for
capturing significant new resources.202 Many studies have described the gap between
the market-based theoretical model of PES, which emphasises private user demand,
and PES in practice.203 The track record of PES highlights the important role that
governments play in programme design, implementation, monitoring, and
financing.204 If these solutions are to be pursued, they will need to be accompanied
by long-term, reliable public finance for conservation. Hein et al. write that
“[c]ontrary to existing PES schemes, [a new] funding mechanism should finance
the long-term conservation of biodiversity in low-income and middle-income
developing countries per se, that is, regardless of any other ecosystem services
provided by an ecosystem.”205 A recent UNCTAD report makes a related point,
emphasising that effective market mechanisms rely on robust state policy and
regulation that define them, drive demand, and ensure enforcement:
“‘market-like’ solutions to the environmental breakdown, such as carbon pricing or
tax incentives, are only as good as the state policies that define them. The market
does not achieve remedies on its own accord. The use of pricing disciplines has a place
in a comprehensive global strategy to arrest and reverse climate catastrophe, but they
are, by themselves, not a solution.”206
199 Robertson, 2006.
200 Salzman et al., 2018.
201 Ibid.
202 Ibid.
203 Muradian et al., 2010; Shapiro-Garza et al., 2020.
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In part because “biodiversity conservation” is difficult to standardise and measure,
monitoring tends to be inconsistent and/or insufficient
In part because there are few biodiversity-focused PES, evidence on outcomes
for biodiversity is limited. As noted above, biodiversity – relying on complex relations
among multiple ecosystem variables – is more difficult to standardise and measure
than some other ecosystem services. A review by Calvet-Mir et al. of biodiversity-
focused PES uses “biodiversity” as a general term to refer to all conservation
outcomes, but only 17 of the 30 programmes reviewed had biodiversity as an explicit
focus, with “biodiversity” in many of these cases referring to habitat conservation
for a single species.207 Most of these programmes do not directly monitor biodiversity
outcomes, but use proxies such as land cover or agroforestry practices to
demonstrate biodiversity outcomes. This is an important gap in research because
such proxies do not provide direct evidence as to biodiversity outcomes: for instance,
while Costa Rica’s PES programme includes biodiversity conservation as a goal, it
relies solely on forest cover as a proxy measure for ecosystem services,208 a metric
which indicates little about biodiversity outcomes in a context where PES also include
payments for plantation forestry. As Hein et al. point out, “safeguarding the supply
of a specific ecosystem service does not necessarily involve protecting the species
or genetic diversity in the ecosystem”, and where biodiversity is not the explicit
goal of PES these programmes may negatively impact biodiversity.209
Literature assessing outcomes specifically for biodiversity in PES is limited,
and there is little consistency in methods for assessing outcomes. Evidence in the
review literature suggests that the carbon-driven policy frameworks in REDD+ fail
to address drivers of biodiversity loss, and in some cases may accelerate them or
undermine local practices that sustain biodiversity, even where co-benefits are
ostensibly prioritised.210 Even in those programmes that are explicitly focused on
biodiversity – such as the four programmes reviewed by Ingram et al.211 – these are
often not oriented toward biodiversity as such but toward specific charismatic
species of interest to downstream users, such as sport hunters of wild turkeys in
Guatemala or ecotourism for birdwatching in Cambodia. In such instances “land
owners may not be interested in maintaining the overall ecosystem, but may instead
intervene to shape the ecosystem to heighten specific attributes or the presence
and visibility of species attractive to tourists”.212 The indirect and offsite outcomes
of PES interventions, which may impact biodiversity elsewhere, are also not well
207 Calvet-Mir et al., 2015.
208 Daniels et al., 2010.
209 Hein et al., 2013, p. 91.
210 Krause & Nielsen, 2019; Bayrak & Marafa, 2016.
211 Ingram et al., 2014.
212 Hein et al., 2013, p. 91.
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understood. David Lansing has shown how Costa Rica’s PES has subsidised
commercial forestry, resulting in more homogenous “plantation forests” planted
with a majority of a single non-native tree species used in the production of wooden
shipping pallets for export agriculture.213 Lansing thus argues that “PES payments
for reforestation have become an indirect subsidy for plantation agriculture”,214
raising questions about the broader impact of PES on drivers of biodiversity loss.
When driven by user demand (the market), PES initiatives are vulnerable to market
fluctuations and tend to have an overly narrow focus on species and solutions of
direct interest to buyers
In contrast to government-driven PES programmes, user- or market-driven
programmes can expose both biodiversity outcomes and participants’ livelihoods
to new market risks. Ingram et al.’s review of four PES programmes for biodiversity
notes that “because the PES initiatives are highly demand-driven, the financial
sustainability and long-term revenues for these projects are dependent on the
markets that exist for sport hunting, ecotourism, and certified rice”.215 Because most
PES require significant and often irreversible changes in participants’ livelihood
strategies (such as abandoning farming activities), this means that both biodiversity
outcomes and participants’ livelihoods are subject to risks of programme failure
due to market changes or other variables. Although PES are often heralded as a
more sustainable financing mechanism, this is only the case so long as biodiversity
outcomes remain economically valuable for downstream users, or if demand is
high for those services, and only insofar as programme costs can remain competitive
with regard to other sources of substitutable ecosystem services.
The lack of funding for biodiversity-focused PES and the focus on charismatic
species highlight a key limitation of PES, insofar as these programmes are only viable
for ecosystem services that have economic value for downstream users, or
consumers. This means that ecologically significant but non-charismatic or
geographically-remote species are unlikely to benefit from PES finance or ecotourism
revenues.216 Green certification has similar limits, insofar as “the impact of such
management in plantations is limited to species whose presence can be reconciled
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This raises a broader issue for understanding PES outcomes in general:
assessments of PES effectiveness (the degree to which programmes achieve
environmental goals) are narrowly defined according to the market demand. This
has led some scholars to conclude that user-financed PES programmes are more
efficient than government-financed programmes because there is a strong incentive
to impose conditionality (payments are not made unless the ecosystem service is
produced).218 This indicates the limited ability of user-driven PES to address broader
social and ecological issues, especially if these programmes are made to conform
to models of market exchange between ecosystem service “buyers” and “sellers”.
While they may succeed in enhancing ecosystem service flows to specific users –
which may range from urban water consumers or powerful agro-industrial
interests219 – this says little about their implications for environmental health or
sustainability in general. In these instances such initiatives may primarily serve to
legitimise environmentally-harmful industries by partially mitigating their impacts,
while doing little to address fundamental drivers of biodiversity loss.
The links between PES and export agriculture in Costa Rica, mentioned above,
reflect broader concerns about “leakage” in PES and related programmes, i.e. that
conservation interventions in one area may simply displace destructive activities to
other areas. Leakage and other offsite outcomes of PES programmes have not been
sufficiently addressed in the literature, and constitute an important research gap:
for instance, given that the majority of PES programmes focus on changing or
curtailing farming by small-scale landholders, how might PES contribute to
agricultural consolidation and intensification, and with what social and
environmental effects?
A key lesson from the literature is the need to align programme goals with
drivers of biodiversity loss, interventions, and monitoring.220 Inconsistent monitoring
and metrics make comparison of PES outcomes difficult in general,221 but particularly
so for biodiversity. If biodiversity is to be a PES goal, robust monitoring for biodiversity
outcomes – beyond proxies such as forest cover or even single-species surveys – is
necessary. This presents a challenge to existing PES, as monitoring increases
transaction costs in PES and payments in most programmes are currently determined
through negotiation between programme managers and providers or by fiat (for
instance in government programmes).222 Establishing effective monitoring and
sufficient payments requires significant contextual knowledge and interaction with
prospective participants as a necessary part of programme design.223 Another key
218 Wunder et al., 2008.
219 Nelson et al., 2020.
220 Panfil & Harvey, 2015.
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challenge lies in designing PES to address the drivers of biodiversity loss or land
conversion. Evidence from REDD+ programmes suggests that strong influence of
international donors and monetary valuation of ecosystem services (carbon) can
divert attention from the drivers of forest loss.224 This means that, similar to other
biodiversity conservation strategies, it is vitally important to design PES in a context-
specific manner – a point that has been repeatedly stressed in the literature.225 This
means that this approach is not easily standardised across contexts, raising costs
and limiting the potential to “scale-up” PES programmes.
To support just and sustainable outcomes, PES programmes should harmonise
with existing values, knowledge systems, and institutions, and be based on
recognition of Indigenous peoples’ and local communities’ rights
Despite the challenges described above, there are some positive examples of
the potential for PES to support beneficial biodiversity outcomes. Although we have
limited direct evidence on biodiversity outcomes, we do have evidence of various
factors that affect outcomes in PES, positively and negatively, that provide lessons
for biodiversity conservation goals. In the case literature, holistic landscape
management of the type associated with biodiversity tends to be most evident in
programmes that substantively incorporate community participation, and harmonise
with existing values, knowledge systems, and governance institutions that influence
extant land uses. For instance, Dorligsuren and Uilst document participatory wildlife
monitoring and protection in a community-designed Mongolian PES that centred
traditional land-use practices, arguing that this participatory approach offers
“important benefits for conservation of key wildlife species, as do herders’ activities
to protect wildlife from illegal hunting and poaching”.226 A review of community
participation in community-based PES (e.g. PES that enrol organised community
groups rather than individual landholders) found that “community participation
had universally positive impacts on... compliance, consensus-building, community
assets, social capital, legitimacy and environmental impacts”, with communal
contracts being the most influential type of participation positively affecting
environmental outcomes, alongside participatory governance and consultation.227
Case literature suggests that participation in programme design and
governance is important for supporting participant buy-in and perceptions of
legitimacy, incorporating traditional ecological knowledge, and aligning participant
values with programme goals – all of which have implications for outcomes.228 For
224 Milne et al., 2019.
225 Reed et al., 2017; Barton et al., 2017.
226 Dorligsuren & Uilst, 2019, p. 21; see also Upton, 2020.
227 Brownson et al., 2019, p. 9.
228 Betrisey et al., 2018; Bayrak & Marafa 2016; Brownson et al., 2019.
62
instance, when their values are not represented in programme design, participants
may express them in ways that undermine programme goals, including protest,
non-participation, sabotage and modifying conservation activities to prioritise other
values.229 Failure to incorporate local ecological knowledge can also lead to the
elimination of land-use activities that support biodiversity.230 Recognition of land
rights is also an important motivator of participation: in Aboriginal-led carbon
farming programmes in Australia, aboriginal ownership of land has been critical to
programme success,231 while in community-based PES formalisation of community
land rights has enhanced participation.232 In contrast, where PES programmes have
conflicted with traditional use or curtailed land rights, land conflicts have enhanced
inequities, complicated benefit distribution, and undermined programme
effectiveness.233
These findings suggest the importance of incorporating social goals alongside
environmental ones. A recent systematic review by Ola et al. of 56 programmes in
Asia, Africa, and Latin America found that 54% of these programmes “attained ‘win-
win’ outcomes” for environmental and poverty-alleviation goals, with three decisive
factors: 1) high levels of payments that cover transaction and opportunity cost of
participants (found in only 41% of programmes); 2) monitoring of ecosystem
services; and 3) equity.234 In addition, adequate, reliable, and equitable benefit-
sharing of biodiversity use is key to sustaining enrolment.235 Ola et al. find that
“establishing participatory, distributive and contextual equity is essential” in the
initial assessment and design stage, and that “[t]he presence (absence) of equity
enhances (diminish) the impact of PES programs”.236 Equity enhances trust among
buyers and sellers of ES, decreases transaction costs, and enhances safeguards for
vulnerable populations.237 Equity not only supports environmental outcomes but is
important in ensuring sustainable outcomes in PES that are consistent with the
Convention on Biological Diversity and other intergovernmental agreements.
229 Kauffman & Martin, 2014; Nelson et al., 2020; Harrell et al., 2016; Shapiro-Garza, 2013.
230 Bayrak & Marafa, 2016, p. 11.
231 Jackson et al., 2017.
232 Brownson et al., 2019.
233 Bayrak and Marafa, 2016; Brownson et al., 2019; Milne et al., 2019; Boerner et al., 2017.
234 Ola et al., 2019, pp. 58, 62; Ingram et al., 2014, have argued that PES programmes can be effective for
biodiversity only where this is the priority over and above social goals; however, their review importantly did
not address any cases in which social goals were on par with biodiversity goals, rendering these conclusions
largely speculative. Further, that study found that all four programmes reviewed had both positive livelihood
and biodiversity outcomes, demonstrating that such goals can be compatible.
235 Milne et al., 2019; Pascual et al., 2014.
236 Ola et al., 2019, p. 62.
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As discussed above, the majority of PES initiatives stray from the original theory
of user-driven, market transactions, and instead are initiated, managed, and financed
by governments.238  As user-financed PES are less likely to integrate social goals,239
this suggests a strong role for governments in prioritising equity objectives and
aligning PES with other policy frameworks. PES programmes have been shown to
be more effective when integrated with other poverty-reduction or environmental
policies. Locally-appropriate and robust safeguards against market risks, and
governance arrangements that empower local participants in decision-making and
integrate local ecological knowledge, are necessary to support biodiversity outcomes
and participant livelihoods.240
3.2 Private investment in biodiversity-enhancing projects is small,
geographically constrained, and in a perpetual state of “proof of
concept”
Introduction
Leading up to the Rio Earth Summit and the adoption of the CBD, scientists
and conservationists pointed to the economic value of biological diversity, the
untapped trillions in what now goes by the term “natural capital”. For example, the
1987 World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) report Our
Common Future, optimistically predicted that the economic value in genetic
resources alone “is enough to justify species preservation”,241 suggesting that the
economic value of forests harnessed through bioprospecting would be able to secure
their conservation over alternative land uses such as intensive timber extraction or
conversion to agriculture. In the 1990s this focus was placed on promoting
biodiversity-friendly economic development, such as from bioprospecting and
ecotourism. As the climate agenda, and in particular the carbon market, ramped
up, energy turned in the mid-2000s to the possibility of climate action also funding
biodiversity conservation and sustainable use, most famously with the attention to
avoided deforestation schemes like REDD, schemes that are now often going under
the more general and controversial term “nature-based solutions”. While, as we
show in sections 3.1 and 3.3, much of the funds backstopping these initiatives are
public, the mid-2000s began an era of enthusiasm for increasing the role of private,
return-oriented finance in biodiversity conservation and sustainable use. In an era
of austerity (see Part 2 above), it has become commonplace to look to private capital
as holding  the  key  to  bridge  the  so-called  biodiversity  funding  gap:  the oft-cited
  USD 300-700 billion shortfall between what is currently flowing to biodiversity
238 Ola et al., 2019.
239 Ingram et al., 2014.
240 Ibid.
241 World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987, p. 155.
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finance to fund conservation endeavours and the amounts ostensibly required to
scale them up to achieve internationally agreed conservation goals and targets.
The questions we ask in this section include: how large is private sector investment
in biodiversity conservation and sustainable use? Where are these flows of capital
going, geographically? How much staying power do these mechanisms have?
Key points
• Flows of for-profit biodiversity finance are small and can pose risks to
livelihoods and rights
• For-profit biodiversity investment is concentrated in developed countries
• There is risk that “catalysing” private finance will lead to private gains and
social losses and continue proliferation of short-term, pilot projects
Flows of for-profit biodiversity finance are small and can pose risks to livelihoods
and rights
Over the past decade what is known as conservation finance, or conservation
impact investing, has grown in prominence. Assessing the size of these investments
poses particular challenges, as the field is highly fragmented and often privately
held. Research shows that these capital flows are tiny in relation to the size of the
problems and essentially infinitesimal in the world of capital flows writ large.242
Take, for example, the private capital flowing into avoided deforestation and
ecosystem restoration. In 2008 the Eliasch review concluded that including REDD
in a well-designed carbon trading system could provide the finance and incentives
to reduce deforestation rates up to 75% by 2030. One scenario modelled by the
review predicted that USD 7 billion could be generated by the carbon markets by
2020.243  What happened? The graph below from Ecosystem Marketplace’s 2020
report gives a visual summary of the decades since then in the voluntary carbon
market.244 The cumulative transaction value is, of course, growing (the red line) – as
years of value pile onto each other – but the market has remained relatively flat in
market size in yearly terms, with some growth in the past couple of years. It is
important to note that of the USD 320 million transacted in 2019, only about half is
in forestry and land-use offsets – just shy of USD 160 million. While that may sound
like a large number, it is, for example, a fraction of most large university annual
budgets (UBC, where many of us work, is about USD 1.6 billion), far less than the
USD 1.5 billion Vale SA company paid in fines for dam burst in Brazil or less than the
monthly increase of USD 321 million of Jeff Bezos’ fortune since the beginning of
the COVID-19 pandemic.
242 Dempsey & Suarez, 2016; see also Clark et al., 2018.
243 Cf. Eliasch, 2008.
244 Ecosystem Marketplace, 2020.
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Despite its low revenue and small transaction size, it is crucial to note that
ecosystem-based forestry or land-use offsets are not benign for all communities;
depending on the project it can result in land dispossession and further entrench
social inequities.245 One review paper highlights that what they term neoliberal,
and especially for-profit forms of conservation, tend to amplify “pre-existing
inequalities and social differentiations” as new forms of power associated with the
production of market-friendly environments begin to circulate through existing
livelihoods.246 Examples of direct negative impacts are evictions, exclusion from
customary land and natural resources (such as grazing land, firewood, bushmeat,
and medicinal plants); while less direct impacts are the boom-and-bust cycles
provoked by the increase of tourism, with the consequent loss of jobs.247 One
academic paper summarises that REDD+ projects have faced issues of “insecure
land tenure, elite capture of incentives, equity concern between recipients of
payments and beneficiaries of ecosystem services, uncertainty over conditional
based incentives”.248 Other studies point to precarious labour conditions in green
financial projects.249 Regarding water, schemes like tradable water rights can
negatively impact ecosystems and people, as is the conclusion of a recent study of
Chile.250 We also point to the section above (3.1) on PES, where the evidence suggests
that market-driven projects are less likely to integrate social goals251 and also tend
to consider a narrow(er) range of species.
245 For an overview of social impacts see Holmes & Cavanagh, 2016.
246 Ibid, p. 205.
247 Ibid. p. 200.
248 Clark et al., 2018, p. 341.
249 Neimark et al., 2020.
250 Prieto et al., 2019.
251 Ingram et al., 2014.
252 From Ecosystem Marketplace, 2020.
Figure 6. Historical market-wide voluntary offset transaction values252




















The story with bioprospecting is similar to that of land-based offsetting. The
2012 Little Book of Biodiversity Finance reports almost negligible finance flowing
from bioprospecting.253 Regarding efforts to expand access and benefit-sharing of
genetic resources, commentators in Science note that “after almost 30 years,
innumerable national ABS measures, and tens of millions of dollars spent discussing
and developing these policies – there is relatively little to show in the way of
conservation, technology transfer, capacity-building, or other monetary or
nonmonetary benefits” of bioprospecting.254
And what about ecotourism as a source of private finance for biodiversity
conservation? Often touted as a win-win solution for ecosystems and communities,
in theory ecotourism attracts capital that can be funnelled to conservation or
development projects.255 Yet the amount of capital generated by ecotourism for
protected areas and biodiversity conservation is uncertain and there is little data
on how much of that revenue is actually funnelled to initiatives aligned with the
CBD goals. Research also notes a “severe lack of data on the contribution of
ecotourism to biodiversity funding”, with revenue from ecotourism often
“inadequate for the conservation of biodiversity in remote areas”.256 Additionally,
ecotourism is a poorly defined phenomenon that some researchers argue is prone
to greenwashing. Capital generated in the name of biodiversity conservation may
not be used for those ends, especially in private conservation areas or ventures.257
A growing body of literature demonstrates that the human consequences of
conservation-related tourist ventures can include land dispossession, livelihood
disruption, state-sanctioned violence and militarisation, localised inequality, and
the exploitation of Indigenous cultures.258 More broadly, a key concern surrounding
ecotourism’s role in conservation-related ventures is the fact that it consumes the
very resources it claims to protect.259 Though ecotourism helps realise revenue in
the form of park entrance fees or payments for lodgings and tours, such activities
come at an ecological cost. Higher rates of tourism, especially in concentrated areas,
can result in increased fossil fuel emissions, habitat destruction, excessive demand
on local natural resources, and disruption to protected wildlife.260 Given tourism’s
place at the “heart of global development policies” in conjunction with its uncertain
post-COVID future, ecotourism specifically warrants re-evaluation with regard to
its role as a lever for biodiversity finance.261
253 Parker et al., 2012.
254 Laird et al., 2020, p. 1201.
255 Stronza et al., 2019.
256 Hein et al., 2013, p. 88.
257 See, for instance, Hein et al., 2013; Stronza et al., 2019; Fletcher, 2019.
258 See, for instance, Ojeda, 2012; Loperena, 2016; Péres et al., 2017; Devine, 2017; Devine & Ojeda, 2017; Di
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What’s the take-home? One research paper concludes, “Expecting such a
shortfall [in funding for SDGs, including biodiversity conservation] to be picked up
by the private, or indeed any other sector, is arguably misguided and clearly
represents the current disconnect between stated ambitions and reality.”262 So far,
the return-generating (meaning for-profit) conservation finance sector faces serious
challenges to scaling up, a problem readily recognised by the sector itself. The
Conservation Finance Alliance concludes, “The overwhelming majority of the
financial sector has yet to show interest in biodiversity conservation.”263 Or, as
NatureVest and their co-authors plainly state, conservation investments are much
“less competitive compared to competing market opportunities”.264 Similar insights
are outlined in a 2020 overview of the field by the Paulson Institute, The Nature
Conservancy, and Cornell University. This report notes the limited flows of private
finance moving into biodiversity conservation and sustainable use, particularly in
comparison to the need.265 The state of play regarding the scale and scope of private
investment – of returns-generating, profit-oriented biodiversity conservation finance
– depicts an emerging but halting, precarious, and still largely promissory global
economic sector.
Biodiversity offsets may be inimical to transformative change
Thought to connect economic growth with sustainability, biodiversity offsets rest upon
the notion that development projects can compensate for biodiversity’s degradation by
restoring or protecting biodiversity elsewhere. While the OECD defines biodiversity offsets
as the “economic instruments used to allow for some continued economic development
whilst simultaneously delivering biodiversity objectives”,266 other definitions emphasise
the connection with conservation. Among these, ten Kate et al. argue biodiversity offsets
are “conservation actions intended to compensate for the residual, unavoidable harm
to biodiversity caused by development projects, so as to ensure no net loss of
biodiversity”.267 Definitions like the latter have given biodiversity offsets a place together
with financial mechanisms deemed innovative for CBD implementation such as carbon
offsets and green bonds. However, several fronts complicate the implementation of
offsets.
First, the attempt to re-create a degraded ecosystem elsewhere suggests that
ecosystems can be isolated from their “spatial, evolutionary, historical, and social”268
262 Clark et al., 2018, p. 338.
263 Conservation Finance Alliance, 2014, p. 4.
264 NatureVest & EKO Asset Management Partners, 2014, p. 12.
265 Deutz et al., 2020.
266 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2016, p. 20
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contexts; that ecosystems are replaceable. Yet research conducted on the first mitigation
wetlands programmes implemented in the US following the approval of the Clean Water
Act of 1974 – arguably the most well-known offset programme in the world - shows low
success of plant cover and functionality in restored ecosystems.269 Second, while best
practice for biodiversity offsets involves strong compliance of the mitigation hierarchy,
one that enforces avoidance of impacts before the mitigation and compensation phases,
research shows that not all offsetting programmes apply this hierarchy. Having offsets
as the final part of this hierarchy has been found to disincentivise implementation of
earlier stages of the mitigation hierarchy.270 Third, biodiversity offsets require a complex
methodology to incorporate aspects of impacted ecosystems, creating situations where
“what is not measured, is not compensated”.271 This is more pressing given that, according
to research conducted in the US, current assessments to calculate mitigation banking
measures have become more simplistic compared to older “non-commercial”
methodologies circulating as early as in the 1980s.272 Fourth, in order to certify sites to
offer “biodiversity offset credits” (one of the most used units of exchange), baselines
are needed to confirm that those sites are indeed being protected because of this market
— business-as-usual would be degradation of these areas. According to recent research
in Australia,273 offsets can further biodiversity loss when baselines are elaborated to
show “unrealistically large amounts of credit”. This modus operandi of crediting baselines
creates pervasive incentives that can undermine the mitigation hierarchy and ultimately
provoke bigger amounts of biodiversity loss. As one research team observes, “generating
gains against a static baseline or, indeed, an improving trajectory, is likely to be more
costly than averted loss”.274 And fifth, using biodiversity offsets to inject capital flows
into conservation can pose risks to achieving transformative change, as the bridging of
conservation with economic growth can weaken the public debate around large-scale
extractive projects that cause great harm to biodiversity, as well as obscuring the most-
needed discussions on alternatives to the current ecological crisis.275 Finally, lack of
legitimacy among local governmental institutions and a closed selection of actors to
participate in the design and validation phases of these programmes are also factors
that turn biodiversity offsets into “sources of social contestation and operational
challenges”.276 For all these reasons, biodiversity offsets are unlikely to move forward in
the way its promoters suggest.277
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For-profit biodiversity investment is concentrated in developed countries
The global geographic distribution of biodiversity finance, both public and
private, is uneven, with the bulk flowing to developed countries (see Part 1). This
situation has not changed a great deal over the past decade, either. One 2012 report
concluded that the United States, Canada, Europe, and China “generate and receive
the majority of the world’s biodiversity finance”.278 This pattern is only exacerbated
in private financial flows; the OECD 2020 Private Finance for Sustainable
Development report found that only 5.3% of private finance went to LDCs and other
LICs for 2017-2018.279 A recent (2020) BIOFIN report notes that impact investing (a
term that refers to investing meant to return in positive social and environmental
impacts, as well as profit) in conservation is concentrated in the USA and Europe,
only recently reaching developing countries.280 Other, earlier studies confirm this
geographical concentration of private capital. A 2014 industry-sponsored survey of
private investment in conservation found that 92% of the private investment
originated from US-based investors and that across the three areas of conservation
investment examined (green commodities, habitat, and water), Canada and the
United States received 82% of this finance.281 Similar patterns are found in voluntary
carbon markets. The Financial Times recently reported that most voluntary offsets
are found in the US, which accounts for 23% of the total projects, with China, India,
Turkey, and Brazil accounting for 44% of active projects in the voluntary market
(together).282
278 Cf. Parker et al., p. 109.
279 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2020c.
280 Global Biodiversity Finance Initiative (BIOFIN), 2020. Also see Hamrick, 2016.
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Figure 7: Geographical distribution of voluntary offset programmes283
Source: Allied Crowds © FT
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There is risk that catalysing private financial flows will lead to private gains and
social losses and continue proliferation of short-term, pilot projects
Given this track record, where is this segment of potential biodiversity finance
heading? The 2020 Paulson, The Nature Conservancy and Cornell Financing Nature
report calls for using government and philanthropic funds to catalyse private sector
investment, and for national and subnational governments to “set policies and take
actions to de-risk and incentivize private sector investment, build in-country support
for sustainable commodity production”.284 What this demonstrates is growing
understanding that private finance will not flow to CBD implementation without
concerted government direction. This raises several questions. One is about risk
distribution: how much risk will the public take on vs. how much risk will the private
sector take on? Sometimes de-risking goes by the term “blended finance”, which
we take up in the following section (3.3), an approach also plagued with challenges
and lopsided risk-return outcomes.
Another question is what kind of projects will private finance invest in, and
how are private flows governed in relation to the three CBD objectives? What
transparency and disclosure will be required of these financial mechanisms? And
finally, how will known social impacts and questions of land rights be managed,
particularly if the objective is to scale up existing efforts? As section 3.1 outlines,
the evidence shows that when payments for ecosystem services projects are driven
by the market, they become vulnerable to market fluctuations and tend to have an
overly narrow focus on species and solutions of direct interest to buyers; they also
tend to be less likely to integrate with social concerns. The research also suggests
that the best and most just initiatives harmonise with existing values, knowledge
systems, and institutions, and are based on recognition of stakeholder rights – this
means that projects are slow and participatory, often inimical to scaling up. As one
report writes in relation to climate finance, rather than trying to “shift the trillions”
of private capital, our efforts may be better placed in modifying global political
economic relations – like tax regimes, trade agreements, and regulations that can
“structure markets in socially useful directions”.285
Finally, there are concerns about private-sector or elite-driven “innovation”
when it comes to biodiversity and how a culture of pilot projects that rarely achieve
scale contribute to consistently missed CBD targets. Social scientists have
demonstrated the ways that the fixation on innovative financial and conservation
mechanisms and the culture of piloting creates “dynamics of expectations” among
communities who are the recipients of these projects.286 To get pilot projects running,
project developers and policymakers raise expectations to enroll actors, especially
when it comes to competing for grant funds and securing legitimacy with
284 Duetz et al., 2020, p. 7.
285 Reyes, 2020, p. 116.
286 Massarella et al., 2018.
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communities of practitioners.287  But when the hype of expectations does not meet
reality, public blame and judgment can occur inside communities that are enrolled
in these projects. In this culture of piloting, many of the efforts made to push for
projects crash with the overwhelming reality of implementation, significantly
affecting communities who are constantly asked to participate in market-led
conservation pilots, giving up time and energy, if not radically modifying their
livelihood strategies. For example, in REDD+ pilot projects in Tanzania, funding was
gutted after the pilot phase, leading project developers to withdraw while
communities who had been enrolled were left to pick up the pieces.288 The role of
global finance and investment in these land-based projects has led organisations
such as La Via Campesina to argue that their very premise, based on enabling a set
of mechanisms driven by investment incentives and capital accumulation, “implies
fundamental changes in the relation between people and their territories”;289
changes that reinforce a strong divide between culture and nature, disrupt the social
fabric of indigenous communities, fishing communities, farmers, and even urban
populations, and endanger the basis for the different relations of land and livelihoods.
The culture of innovation and seemingly endless small-scale demonstration
projects that quickly fizzle out have led researchers to observe that pilot projects
and models are “pervasive in contemporary conservation and development
schemes”.290 According to Asiyanbi and Massarella, efforts to prove efficacy in
demonstration projects tend to isolate the projects from the wider social context.
For example, the Norwegian government, the principal funder of REDD+ in Tanzania,
commissioned a series of studies to evaluate the success of REDD+ in the country
between 2009 and 2014; the studies presented model projects as “success stories”
with “lessons learnt”, but failed to tell the full story.291 Asiyanbi and Massarella point
to the exclusion of information about the fragmentation of one village in Kilosa,
where farmers were relocated from the newly defined village forest reserves. This
relocation produced conflict between supporters of REDD+ in the area and farmers
who refused to leave and continued farming in the reserve. By the end of the project
the problem only increased; however, none of this information was included in the
reports commissioned by the Embassy of Norway.292 As it is becoming increasingly
evident across market-based and profit-oriented conservation, REDD+ pilots and
models cannot walk their talk. This does not, however, obviate the need for ex-post
evaluation and monitoring of the performance of individual projects, or market-
based strategies as a whole, given how widely they have proliferated and the vast
sums of public money that have gone into their development.
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3.3 Blended finance is unlikely to deliver a sustainable future
Introduction
Blended finance uses concessionary or grant capital from non-governmental
organisations, states, development banks, and philanthropists as a means of
attracting private investors. While blended finance can mostly be seen as a principle
for structuring financing rather than a financial mechanism, it can nonetheless be
seen as a central underlying principle that was used to promote “new and innovative
financial mechanisms”. Blended finance has recently gained traction in a variety of
policy areas, one of which is biodiversity financing. We explore the following three
questions in an effort to interrogate the workings of blended finance: 1) What has
been the role of blended finance as a form of development finance? 2) What is the
broader political economic context that blended finance operates within? 3) Will
blended finance engender the development of sustainable markets?
Key points
• The originality of blended finance should not be overemphasised
• The emphasis on blended finance is symptomatic of austerity and insufficient
ODA
• There is no guarantee that blended finance and associated private investments
are the most efficient solution to arrest biodiversity loss
The originality of blended finance should not be overemphasised
The Global Environment Facility’s recent emphasis on so-called blended finance
as a method for mobilising private finance for biodiversity conservation is indicative
of the prominence that the concept has achieved over the last decade.293 The main
novelty of blended finance is its aim to support the Sustainable Development Goals,
introduced in 2015. Before this, however, creating markets for private finance has
been a central raison d’être for multilateral development banks (MDBs), and MDBs
continue to serve this function, if only at an increased scale in recent years.294 The
use of capital from development finance institutions and states to actively facilitate
markets is therefore far from new.
There is a proliferation of actors serving the blended finance trajectory. Non-
governmental organisations and philanthropists now often see their role as actively
supporting and applying blended finance approaches. While blended finance is often
presented as a novel approach for making nature investable, it is difficult to ignore
the central role that development finance, NGOs, and philanthrocapitalists have
293 Global Environment Facility Independent Evaluation Office, 2017.
294 Romero, 2014; Romero & Van de Poel, 2014; Dimakou, Romero & Van Waeyenberge, 2020; Christiansen,
2021.
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played when it comes to market-based environmental governance, providing crucial
support for new schemes like forest carbon markets.295 It is possible that the role of
non-profit or concessional financing is increasingly acknowledged as a tool for
market-based environmental governance and that these tools are being refined as
a result, but its “innovativeness” and ability to change the status quo should not be
overemphasised as it has long been part of the development finance tool kit.
The emphasis on blended finance is symptomatic of austerity and insufficient official
development assistance
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are often seen as a series of funding
gaps that need to be filled – one way or another.296 As we have accounted for in
previous sections of this report, one feature that severely hampers actions to limit
biodiversity loss is austerity and the inability (or unwillingness) to properly tax
polluters to raise funding for mitigating biodiversity loss or, more ambitiously, to
address the drivers in the form of regulation of development and investment.297
Thus, the funding gap is not a fact of nature, but a political choice (much like choosing
to continue subsidising biodiversity-averse extraction). In this context, scarce funding
in the form of official development assistance is presented as mainly a means of
attracting private investment for the SDGs.298 Actors like the World Bank see the
effort for meeting private investors’ risk and return requirements as a precondition
for “maximising finance for development”.299 Thus, blended finance as it is currently
being promoted seems to have become a prominent financing strategy because
alternative fiscal policies that challenge austerity internationally and nationally have
been off the table.
It is, of course, difficult to dismiss any intervention that can be considered
blended finance tout court since blended finance is merely a means of attracting
private capital, but the goals of what that capital is to do remains a political
question.300 It is, however, a worrying tendency that the current framing of blended
finance takes the biodiversity funding gap for granted as an absolute amount of
capital, that the specifics of how that capital is allocated are not discussed, and that
the main aim of blended finance in making biodiversity investable is thus to de-risk
investments for private investors in order to make those projects more attractive.
The effect of this within the field of climate finance, as Reyes has argued, is that
blended finance is used to support projects that would have been invested in without
295 Holmes, 2012; Olesen et al., 2018.
296 Gabor, 2019.
297 See also Steinfort, 2019.
298 Mawdsley, 2020.
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any “blending” or that blended finance has been used to bail out failed projects.301
In its most optimistic formulations, blended finance is seen to mitigate risk for capital
and thereby facilitate new markets, but the risk with this approach is of course that
it merely guarantees the incomes of investors and investment bankers rather than
people and natures with greater need.302 Meanwhile, the additional private finance
that is attracted is intended to create a trickle-down “developmental additionality”
(defined as the development benefits in terms of employment, sustainability, etc.
that private finance on top of the initial public or philanthropic outlay is said to
bring).303 However, researchers have raised questions about the labour conditions
in green finance projects, with one study showing precarious employment.304
Market-based conservation can itself be part of entrenched social inequalities.305
What then, we ask, is guaranteed with blended finance: secure employment and
critical ecosystems or incomes for investors in developed countries?
There is no guarantee that blended finance and the private investments that it
facilitates are the most efficient solution
The implication of thinking about biodiversity conservation as simply a matter
of mobilising as much capital as possible is that more capital is necessarily an
improvement. Such thinking takes the financing gap as gospel, reducing action on
biodiversity to a question of finance. While additional financing is clearly needed,
this cannot be the totality of action, and further, the source of investment matters.
The preference for blended finance assumes that its application will necessarily
“crowd in” private capital that would not necessarily have been used for biodiversity
purposes otherwise. Unfortunately, the equation is not that simple. Research on
other sectors shows that private/public partnerships (PPPs), a critical tool for blended
finance approaches, comes with the cost of lower transparency.306 This is sometimes
the result of governments’ attempts to support PPPs in order to lower their debt,
but the result is lower parliamentary transparency.307 Research by the OECD claims
that guarantees are the best blended finance method for attracting private
investments.308 But if investments with a public guarantee fail, however, these
investments themselves come with a public cost and that guarantee could have
been spent otherwise. When blended finance is used to facilitate further public
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302 Christiansen, 2021.
303 Andersen et al., 2019, p. 16.
304 Neimark et al., 2020.
305 Lopez-Alonso, 2017.
306 Hildyard, 2016.
307 Sundaram and Chowdhury, 2020.
308 Lee et al., 2018.
75
debt to private actors, there is a risk that blended deals can become a drain on
existing public resources.309 For example, the Republic of Seychelles recently issued
what has become known as the world’s first Blue Bond. The deal was supported
with a guarantee and a concessional loan from the World Bank and the Global
Environment Facility, and the proceeds from the bonds are intended for improving
its marine management. While this deal technically did raise private capital in the
form of debt, it is the Republic of Seychelles that is the debtor. Even if Seychelles’
investments fail, Seychelles is nonetheless still committed to paying back the
sovereign bond – with interest.310
While the above comments raise some principle issues when it comes to
blended finance, it is difficult to say whether blended finance can fulfil its quantitative
promises in the biodiversity space in terms of raising further capital. Again, it is
worth being cautious, considering experiences from other sectors. Attridge and
Engen soberingly argue that blended finance could not raise “trillions from billions”,
but rather “billions from billions”, and that the private money mobilised through
blended finance does not benefit the countries with the lowest incomes.311 When
examining private-public partnerships (PPPs), which have been a key vehicle for
blended finance, Jomo et al. even go as far as concluding that “the evidence suggests
that PPPs have often tended to be more expensive than the alternative of public
procurement while in a number of instances they have failed to deliver the envisaged
gains in quality of service provision, including its efficiency, coverage and
development impact”.312 Such warnings are indeed worth heeding when blended
finance is being proposed in the biodiversity space.  Below we explore investment
into REDD+ as an example of how much blending it can take to develop a market-
based environmental governance mechanism.
The case of blended finance in REDD+
One way to illustrate these issues in blended finance is through an assessment of REDD+
financing. Initially envisioned as a global Payments for Ecosystem Services market wherein
countries with at-risk forests could be rewarded on a market-basis for protecting those
forests, REDD has, at best, morphed into a “results-based aid programme”,313 and at
worst a tool for dispossession that creates no environmental benefit.314 Between 2008
and 2015, multilateral development banks (MDBs), states and supranationals disbursed
EUR17.2 billion (of which more than EUR2 billion was direct funding) through various
channels to support the development of REDD+ programmes across the world. One
report’s best assessment is that this investment has netted all of EUR31 million in direct
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funding from voluntary carbon offset trades.315 Even if we include green bond financing
(EUR131 million) as part of direct private financing, the report concludes that “REDD+ is
predominantly a public sector supported mechanism.”316 Thus, on its own terms, blended
finance appears to be far from an efficient use of public resources.
Proponents of REDD+ will argue that improvements in monitoring, verification,
and, above all, forest governance, produce a range of other impacts and facilitate private
investments in conservation indirectly that would not have happened otherwise. This
includes supply chain sustainability improvements made possible by this increased
governance capacity.317 If this is indeed the case (though causation would be challenging
to prove), then specifically funding capacity-building for supply chain governance would
seem to be a sensible approach, rather than continuing to fund REDD+ development in
anticipation of a global offset market that never seems to materialise, but which has
incidental supply chain impacts.
All of this raises more questions. With major donors, such as the Norwegian
government and the WBG, contributing a majority of REDD+ ear-marked money for
governance, and governance comprising 56% of total public financial flows for REDD+,
we must ask, who is governing what with improved capacity?318 That is, are public funds
building capacity for administering contracts for private governance or investment, or
are they building institutions in line with, say, the objectives of the CBD, such as Article
10(c) that focuses on encouraging customary use of biological diversity or Article 8(j)?
Overall, REDD+ readiness may have achieved some concrete governance
objectives, but its social and environmental outcomes are mixed at best, and it has
manifestly failed in the economic register for which it was initially devised. The question
is whether this is a good use of public and philanthropic funds. If so much public finance
is needed to achieve such paltry outcomes, is blended finance realistic as a way to
finance the implementation of CBD objectives?
3.4 Voluntary certification and disclosure schemes may have some impact,
but rarely on the scale necessary to halt biodiversity loss
Introduction
At the 1992 Rio Earth summit, organised business lobby groups like the World
Business Council on Sustainable Development and the International Chamber of
Commerce, along with their government allies like the US and Japan, pushed back
at any regulatory or binding efforts to stem biodiversity loss.319 In lieu of international
policies requiring corporations or financial institutions to internalise the social and
environmental costs of their operation, voluntary mechanisms took centre stage.
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This marked the beginning of a wider shift in governance away from states and
towards the market, what some researchers call “non-state, market-driven
governance”.320 Since Rio, international actors have created a dizzying array of
schemes. The commonality between these schemes is that compliance – and thus
authority – is predominantly rooted in the market, not in the state. In this section,
we examine different voluntary strategies that have proliferated in the decades since
Rio with attention to their role in addressing global biodiversity conservation. Thus,
this is not a systematic review of every voluntary scheme’s impact on the ground,
but instead an evaluation of market-based schemes as a stand-in for state-based
governance with regard to the scale and strength of their efforts. Overall, the nature
of voluntary mechanisms – that is, the lack of enforcement or accountability – leads
to a great deal of publicity for alternatives to strong state-driven policies, but,
ultimately, very marginal impacts. We question the continued rollout of new
voluntary efforts such as the Task Force for Nature-Related Financial Disclosures
when there is little evidence that they will be able to provide change on the scale or
time frame needed to meaningfully impact biodiversity loss.
Key Points
• Voluntary mechanisms that rely on businesses to “do the right thing” have
failed to drive action at the pace or scale necessary to meet targets
• Risk management in international finance is insufficient for advancing action
on biodiversity loss
• Schemes that rely on voluntary disclosure struggle on their own terms, and
have yet to demonstrate that risk-based “market discipline” can rein in harmful
finance
• Reining in finance’s impact on biodiversity will require regulation
Voluntary mechanisms that rely on businesses to “do the right thing” have failed
to drive action at the pace or scale necessary to meet targets
Voluntary models are predicated on the belief that consumers, at the level of
individuals, businesses, or investors, like pension funds, will drive change.
Environmental targets will be met, the theory goes, if actors have more information
about the impact of activities and can then use that information to make better,
more sustainable choices. These mechanisms, therefore, largely assume that a
majority of actors will “do the right thing” when it comes to reducing biodiversity
loss. While some do, evidence points to the marginal proportion of industry uptake,
lack of adherence to agreements from those enrolled, and poor strength of professed
environmental targets.
320 Cashore et al., 2007.
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Commodity Certification
One class of voluntary mechanisms focuses on standardising and uplifting the
production of commodities in ways that cause less harm to ecosystems.321 The Forest
Stewardship Council (FSC), formed in 1993 in the immediate wake of the Rio Earth
Summit, is one such mechanism, and an important one with regard to biodiversity
and habitat. One of the FSC’s guiding principles is to maintain high conservation
value (HCV) forests alongside resource extraction. While occasionally successful at
the local level, commodity certification schemes present clear issues of scale. For
example, despite being the largest forest certification regime, the Forest Stewardship
Council (FSC) currently has 213,916,033 hectares under its purview.322 This amounts
to a mere 5.35% of the world’s 4 billion ha of forest. While overall certification was
estimated to cover 424 million ha of forests in 2019 (down 7 million ha from 2018),323
FSC is considered uniquely rigorous, in standard-setting, auditing, and required
consultation with environmental and indigenous groups, especially when compared
to other certification regimes.324 For example, a recent (2020) review of five large
forest certification schemes found that “most of the elements considered in the
FSC Principle 6 (Environmental Impact) are either only superficial, or not addressed
at all, in the other four programs”.325 Moreover, certification schemes must compete
with each other – as with the industry-led Sustainable Forest Initiative, started by
the American Forest and Paper Association, which competes with FSC in the United
States and Canada326 – potentially leading to a kind of certification “race to the
bottom”.
Geographic distribution of certified forest has also been a matter of concern,
with the vast majority of forest certification occurring in the US, Canada and
Europe.327 Figure 8 shows the most recent geographical breakdown provided by
the Forest Products Annual Market Review. The central explanation for this issue –
and that of the scale – is that market uptake of certifications such as the FSC’s has
been “sparse and uneven”, especially in tropical areas in developing countries, likely
due to a lack of demand for “eco” certified products.328 The same seems to be true
for non-forest industries such as fisheries.329 As with myriad other “green” products,
change moves at the pace of consumer interest or ability (meaning, ability to pay
more for products), a pace insufficient for reducing the rates of biodiversity loss. A
2020 review of FSC’s smallholder certified forests (defined as small in area, private
or communal ownership and/or management rather than corporate, and managed
321 For more on the impacts of international trade on biodiversity loss, see section 2.2 of this report.
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for multiple forest values rather than maximum timber yield), found that two-thirds
are in developed countries, where smallholders are “more likely to be price-makers”.
In developing countries – where more biodiversity and more degradation is taking
place – smallholders are more often in a “sell to survive” situation, and thus tend to
eschew lengthy certification schemes that are also costly.330 Forests in developing
countries both house more of the planet’s remaining biodiversity and are more
vulnerable to degradation. Economic and social realities dictate that smallholders
in developing countries are largely constrained by having to sell their timber to
survive and fall in the price-takers category.
Additionally, in areas where commodity certification is present at a significant
scale, there are still barriers to success.331 Recent studies show that even in countries
with comparatively strong uptake of certification for commodities such as soy, palm
oil, and cocoa, negative land-use change (deforestation) is proceeding at pre-
certification rates, or has worsened, a phenomenon that can likely be explained by
the presence of regulatory loopholes.332
330 Bulkan, 2020.
331 Bush et al., 2013, note that certification schemes are often thought to fill governance gaps in developing
countries, even though this is not always the case on the ground. We highlight this assumption here to make
clear how certification schemes, and other voluntary efforts, can be framed as alternatives to state regulatory
approaches, which may be rendered political or economically inviable. While this section focuses on the
bait-and-switch of voluntary mechanisms in national and multilateral policymaking, we also cover how
austerity impacts regulatory ability in Part 2 of this report.
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Figure 8: Share of certified forest area, by region, 2017.333CIS is the
Commonwealth of Independent States.
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Another point that emerges from the literature is the relative marginality of
biodiversity conservation within standards themselves. In the case of the FSC, the
main goal of the policy is the regulation and management of a biophysical resource
that is deeply embedded in commodity production. Cashore et al. suggest that the
conundrum facing voluntary certification regimes is that they must balance the
demands of addressing the environmental and social problems they were created
to confront while not outweighing the (real or perceived) economic benefits.334
Although consideration of biodiversity appears in the FSC and other certification
regimes, it is crucial to note that it stands as one part of a wider standard. Bush et
al. note that most impact assessments tend to focus at the level of a single species,
rather than at the level of an ecosystem where more systematic biodiversity
conservation or loss might be evaluated more accurately.335 This track record arguably
reflects the relatively marginal position of biodiversity conservation in the policy.
Corporate Social Responsibility
While commodity certification mechanisms like FSC may be loosely tracked
based on land-use change or market shares, the impacts of other corporate social
responsibility (CSR) agreements on nature loss are even more challenging to quantify.
Many global agreements celebrate success by the number of supporters who attach
their names to these efforts, while the changes to these businesses practices remain
limited, and internal targets they set are often weak. Thus, these projects seemingly
create a big splash, claiming thousands of businesses or investors have signed on,
when the reality is a far bleaker picture: a handful of actors “doing the right thing”
– or worse, professing concern without subsequent action – while entire destructive
industries remain unregulated and unaccountable for harm, past or present.
The 20-year history of the United Nations Global Compact illustrates this issue
well. The Global Compact is a corporate sustainability initiative meant to align
business practices with the Sustainable Development Goals under the premise of a
shared moral imperative. Despite boasting the support of 10,000 business
participants, their recent (2020) report states that action on these goals has been
far from enough and that more concrete uptake of the compact’s principles is
needed.336 For one example, this report, based on interviews with 40 participants,
most at the level of Chief Sustainability Officer, found that “only 15 per cent of
survey respondents have targets that have been approved by the Science Based
Targets initiative”, which evaluates targets for greenhouse gas emissions against
the 2015 Paris Agreement.337 The problem, of course, is that these efforts have few
tools to enforce stricter targets beyond their perennial calls to action and reminders
334 Cashore et al., 2007.
335 Bush et al., 2013.
336 United Nations Global Compact, 2020.
337 Ibid., p. 14.
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that “time is running out”.338 In the Global Compact 2020 report, particular emphasis
is put on how businesses are still failing to recognise the consequences of their
own environmentally-harmful actions, which is the very thing that these CSR efforts
promised to facilitate.
Researchers have pointed out that initiatives such as the Global Compact face
multi-dimensional barriers, including “vague and difficult to enforce guidelines, low
participation rates, an uneven business case, and confusion arising from multiple
and competing initiatives”.339 Additionally, when it comes to the case of large
voluntary agreements, the entangled nature of the financial system itself is a barrier,
making it difficult to discern who bears the brunt of the responsibility for biodiversity
loss. While there are methodological issues that arise from trying to quantify the
impacts of Corporate Social Responsibility agreements on biodiversity, two things
emerge from the literature: (1) most voluntary mechanisms have struggled to receive
widespread adoption and implementation from businesses, and (2) extractive
activities are continuing (and in some cases, accelerating) at unsustainable rates,
even decades on from Rio. In the next section, we examine efforts to discipline
businesses through the financial sector.
Risk management in international finance is insufficient for advancing action on
biodiversity loss
In 2005, the famed Freshfields report concluded that accounting for
“environmental, social, and governance” (ESG) issues into investment analysis was
not only legally permissible vis-a-vis fiduciary duty, but arguably “required”.340 The
report, commissioned by UNEP Financial Initiative, set in place what was already a
movement to encourage finance to consider factors outside of return, not in
opposition or contra the profit-motive, but as a part of due diligence process that
remains staunchly return-focused. Considering “ESG”, it was found, was simply good
investment practice; it reduces investor risks. Alongside the legal Freshfields analysis
came a raft of third-party environmental, social and governance initiatives that
encourage financial institutions to advance ESG integration. Below we address the
Equator Principles, the United Nations Principles on Responsible Investing, and the
IFC Performance Standards.
In 2003 the Equator Principles were launched, as a “financial industry
benchmark for determining, assessing and managing environmental and social risk
in projects”.341 In a similar way to the Global Compact, the Equator Principles are
338 Ibid., p. 11.
339 Clapp, 2017.
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entirely voluntary; the theory of change is that large multinational banks will benefit
from limiting the practice of lending to or funding projects that drive biodiversity
loss.342 As with the Compact, evidence of impact has been minimal.343 One researcher
notes that a major limitation to voluntary approaches like the Equator Principles is
that they typically only apply to project finance and do “not reflect other very
common financing practices in the finance sector, which are namely the underwriting
and management of shares or bonds. Hence, the investment part of transactions is
completely left out”.344 This oversight is supplemented by the various “loopholes,
grey-areas, and discretionary leeway” that continue to plague evaluation efforts.345
Banks that subscribe to the Equator Principles, such as Barclays and JPMorgan
Chase, have repeatedly come under fire for approving environmentally-harmful
projects such as oil, gas, and mining.346 Of particular note was the revelation that
“13 of the 17 banks that financed the Dakota Access pipeline project were signatories
to the Equator Principles”.347 Following this high-profile gaff, the Equator Principles
promised stricter revisions to their recent update, particularly on human rights,
climate change, and Free, Prior and Informed Consent.348 However, Clapp notes
that the only aspect of the financial sector that responsible investment programmes
are likely to shift is discourse; thus far they’ve proven to lack the teeth to support
any material change beyond this.349
Recent research from Portfolio Earth found that high-profile banks – many of
whom are signatories to some kind of voluntary investment principles – are
implicated in financing deforestation by delivering debt and equity financing to
agribusiness to the tune of USD 44 billion.350 The report argues that banks, regardless
of adherence to voluntary mechanisms, will not be the ones to “draw the line” in
the sand on extraction:
“For instance, the CEO of Goldman Sachs argued in January 2020 that the bank should
not decline to work on deals with companies that lack environmental credentials. He
said: ‘Should we draw a line and say we will not raise money for a company that is a
carbon company, a fossil fuel company? And the answer to that is, we’re not going to
do that, we’re not going to draw a line.’”351
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According to that same report, of the top 10 banks with the most finance at
risk in the fossil fuel sector,352 all but Goldman Sachs are members of the Equator
Principles, and six reportedly have higher exposure than Goldman.353 While Goldman
Sachs is not a member of the Equator Principles, it is a member of the UN Principles
on Responsible Investing (UNPRI). Similar to the Equator Principles, UNPRI is a cohort
of institutional investors who have agreed to invest with ESG principles at the fore.
While signatories report on their achievements in line with the principles, they
remain entirely voluntary with no internal enforcement. As Rowe et al. note, “PRI
has no requirement that investors implement [their principles], and research
suggests that it fails to hold signatories to any minimum standard of practice in
their investment activities”.354
A report by UNPRI paints a similar picture, drawing from a recent (2020)
“collaborative engagement” between institutional investors and 25 of the world’s
largest oil and gas companies. In summary, the report states that “whilst climate-
related disclosure is improving and there is growing recognition of the need for
action, the oil and gas sector’s current emissions trajectory is insufficient to avoid
the catastrophic impacts projected by global warming scenarios”.355 Additionally,
the report indicates that out of the 25 companies, five of them have no apparent
plan for reducing emissions whatsoever.
The International Finance Corporation (IFC), an investment arm of the World
Bank, has also chosen to emphasise ESG in its lending by implementing Performance
Standards (PS) on its clients. Most significant for this paper is PS6, which requires
that companies “implement a mitigation hierarchy of avoiding and minimizing
impacts and offsetting any residual impacts on natural habitats to achieve no net
loss or, in the case of critical habitats, a net gain of biodiversity” in order to receive
financing from the IFC, which is often accomplished via biodiversity offsetting.356
Vaissière et al. note a number of challenges for ensuring that these contract-based
projects adequately compensate for “locally irreversible frontloaded loss of
biodiversity”, and argue for more research, monitoring, and enforcement for these
schemes.357 Thus, although PS may offer additional ways to extend voluntary
certification, they play a limited and somewhat fraught role as with many of the
other voluntary mechanisms discussed above (see section 3.2 for more insight on
biodiversity offsets).
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Portfolio Earth’s report succinctly lays out the state of large voluntary
agreements today, claiming that “voluntary action is not a substitute for legal and
regulatory reform. Global initiatives such as the Consumer Goods Forum, the United
Nations Global Compact (UNGC), the Equator Principles, and the Principles for
Responsible Investment have not led to transformative changes”.358 As we discuss
in the last point of this section, turning off finance to destructive projects faces
many challenges in the realm of voluntary mechanisms, but is not impossible with
regulatory action.
Schemes that rely on voluntary disclosure struggle on their own terms, and have
yet to demonstrate that risk-based “market discipline” can rein in harmful finance
The recently-launched Task Force on Nature-Related Financial Disclosures
(TNFD) (est. 2020) and its climate cousin (TCFD) (est. 2015), are both designed
under the same theory of change: when investors become aware of their climate-
or nature-based risks, they will change course. Both TNFD and TCFD seek to
implement standardised disclosure recommendations to companies and investors
about the risks to their portfolio that might accompany a changed ecosystem or
climate (respectively). These risks include not only the threats of extreme weather
or deforestation, but also projections about the subsequent policy landscape that
may result from such events (i.e. governments transitioning off of fossil fuels, or
regulating certain land-use activities). Using the 2008 housing bubble and market
crash as cautionary tales, these mechanisms warn that if investors don’t take stock
of their entanglements with industries under threat of collapse, overall financial
stability will follow suit. This emphasis on a self-regulating market has led scholars
to argue that TNFD and TCFD represent an outsourcing of state regulation to the
financial sector.359 Brett Christophers describes the emphasis on disclosure as a
tactical political response, characterising “a distinctively neoliberal ‘light-touch’
regulatory approach, whereby disclosure in and of itself is expected to do the work
of maintaining stability”.360 Given the lack of information for the newly-announced
TNFD, this section focuses on what can be learned from the plight of the Task Force
on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures thus far.
Like the UN Global Compact, and other voluntary mechanisms, TCFD has been
very successful at organising supporters, and currently boasts the support of 1,500
organisations globally, including over 1,340 companies with a market capitalisation
of USD 12.6 trillion.361 However, in the TCFD’s five-year history, they have not been
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able to shift investor behaviour enough to keep pace with Paris Agreement targets.362
The TCFD 2019 Status Report stated that disclosures “remain far from the scale the
markets need to channel investment to sustainable and resilient solutions”.363 The
recent 2020 Status Report echoes these concerns, stating that “companies’
disclosure of the potential financial impact of climate change on their businesses
and strategies remains low”, and emphasising the need for “faster progress”.364 It
cannot be stressed enough that time is of the essence in this matter, and that TCFD’s
failure to deliver on the premise of its value – information – means that the
subsequent promise of investor behaviour is quite far behind, if it will arrive at all.
Even if disclosures were proceeding at a faster rate, by TCFD’s own admission,
most investors have yet to see the climate crisis as a threat to business as usual,365
and therefore are unlikely to take recommendations for mitigating climate risk. After
conducting interviews with global investment institutions (from 2017-2018)
Christophers found that, despite the claims that disclosure would create change in
investor behaviour, most investors were slated to remain in fossil fuel companies,
and believed that they would continue to be profitable.366 The findings of this
research are supported by a 2016 survey of institutional investors conducted by
Ameli et al., who note that participants did not see threats coming down the pike to
their investments from either strong climate policy or actual environmental risk.367
Moreover, the authors of that report argue that the foundational logic of TCFD –
the “efficient market hypothesis”, which supposes that reporting and transparency
will lead to behaviour change – is “unsupported by either theory or evidence”.368
While it may be argued that these surveys are outdated, especially given how the
climate crisis becomes more acute each year, an interim report (released December
2020) of a study by BlackRock found that the majority of Europe’s banks have not
formalised a clear ESG risk strategy.369 Reyes, writing in 2020, highlights that this
trend is widespread:
“A recent survey by KPMG found that three-quarters of large companies still do not
identify climate related risks in their annual reporting, with the financial sector
amongst the worst in that regard. And when companies do report on climate change
and sustainability, they typically ignore many of the long-term risks. Companies that
voluntarily disclose their  carbon footprint are not required to take any action on this
basis, and many enter such schemes simply to enhance their reputation. In short,
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disclosure only works if it is ‘mandatory and prescriptive’ and connected to measures
that require companies to limit their exposure to fossil fuel and other high-carbon
investments.”370
We imagine that the “nature risk” principle might face similar, or more severe,
barriers to disclosure. While there are a few clear cases where certain species
declines pose direct links to a firm or an investment (e.g. pollinators), for the most
part, biodiversity loss is a systemic risk to the whole economy, and these risks cannot
be individuated to specific firms easily.371 Ultimately the most potent risk is that of
clear state regulation and the reputational risks that social movements may bring
about by highlighting the worst actors.
Mandatory disclosures, however, may help to bring about change on both of
these fronts. Reyes notes that “climate-related financial disclosure makes visible
who is bankrolling climate change”, and is hopeful that some governments are
beginning to require disclosure.372 These requirements  must be paired with strong
climate or biodiversity policy, which requires state action to stop environment-
harming activities, rather than waiting for investors to lead via behaviour change.
Even mandatory disclosures do not automatically lead to less high-carbon
investment, and Reyes notes a key limitation that “most bank shares are held by
institutional investors, whose fund managers are generally not authorized to move
investments on the basis of ethical concerns”.373 That is, they are legally responsible
for maximising returns, not investing with concern for moral or ecological matters
except where they are known to influence return (as per the Freshfield report,
described above). Thus, further action upon mandatory disclosure is needed; we
discuss the possibilities for addressing this action in the following section.
Finally, we would be remiss not to consider the social implications for
approaching climate change and nature loss primarily as a threat to the global
economy. Christophers describes this distinction through the example of a Pacific
island facing sea level rise: if the island is disconnected from the global financial
system, is this a “climate risk” the TCFD is concerned with? Not likely.374 Edwards et
al. put this concern about the TCFD methodology more bluntly: “The inclination of
markets to discriminate purely on financial terms risks decisions and actions devoid
of public good and/or consideration of those most exposed and vulnerable to climate
risk.”375 They urge us to consider how these limitations would continue to be
reproduced, even if required disclosure was adopted by the public sector.376
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Thus, while disclosure is gaining popularity among certain institutions, there
is a far distance to travel for these mechanisms in (a) uptake of disclosing climate
and nature risk; (b) demonstration that this disclosure shifts financial flows in ways
significant to the mounting climate and biodiversity crises; and (c) mandates for
disclosure among states and financial regulators. As we discuss in the following
section, it ought to be considered what should be done with this information once
it is disclosed, if we are to truly use it as a means of addressing destructive industries
and practices.
Reining in finance’s impact on biodiversity will require regulation
Before evaluating potential mechanisms for reining in harmful finance, it’s
critical to note that despite their evident inadequacy at preventing biodiversity loss,
the fact that a number of high-profile institutions have felt the need to adopt a
range of voluntary measures demonstrates that finance and business felt some
global pressure. But waiting for the threat of ecological collapse to create material
risks for Fortune 500 CEOs is – and has been – a losing strategy. The idea that
funding and regulating biodiversity protection should be outsourced to the private
sector is increasingly being met with scepticism, even by financial elites. Take the
recent Paulson Report, which emphasises the role of governments in setting and
funding policy agendas, not the private sector.377 While some of this work reiterates
the well-worn mantra that governments need to better set the table for the private
sector with policy and “catalysing” public funds, it is worth reviewing some of the
proposals for state action that could rein in harmful flows of finance.
First, of course, disclosure of impact on biodiversity can be required and made
public. From here, governments can legislate liability regimes for financial actors to
build in accountability for financial flows negatively impacting biodiversity.378
Fiduciary duty and associated concepts that govern institutional finance can be
revised to require protection of public goods like a safe climate and biological diversity
and to include legal agreements like the United Nations Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).379 Additionally, public pensions, sovereign wealth
funds, and central bank policies could be required to align with CBD decisions and
targets.380
Overall, financial regulation (such as higher capital requirements for banks’
investments in activities that are likely to lead to biodiversity loss) could further
nudge financial institutions to not invest in biodiversity loss in the first place.381
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Some economists have started to model how a penalising factor for fossil fuel
investments and a supporting factor for green investments can slow down climate
change.382 While such proposals require clear and legally sanctionable definitions,
biodiversity considerations could be incorporated into these important proposals.
The Bankrolling Extinction report describes some changes to banking regulations
and processes that could better address the risks of biodiversity loss:
“Alongside the immediate exclusion of practices with devastating impacts on
biodiversity, the frameworks in which banks operate need to be overhauled. This
includes the systematic inclusion of biodiversity considerations in lending decisions,
risk management, and the development of corresponding due diligence systems. It
also necessitates the development of procedures to measure the impact lending
activities have on biodiversity, and transparency when it comes to reporting risks and
impacts. Most importantly, in order to cease funding activity with detrimental effects
on nature, banks will have to accept that as enablers of such activities, they are co-
responsible and liable for their impacts.”383
There is no shortage of ideas to reform financial markets in service of a livable
planet. These proposals face a number of barriers to their actualisation, namely
the consolidated power of the financial and corporate sectors.384 Moreover, these
actions alone can neither stand in for a reckoning with past environmental harm,
which we explore in Part 1 of this report, nor the ongoing impacts of austerity,
inequality-refinancing policies, corporate-focused trade rules, and investment
policies discussed in Part 2. Yet, in the face of perpetual and ineffectual voluntary
schemes, it is important to forefront the many options we do have for regulating
the industries and investors who continue to finance biodiversity loss with few
material consequences.
382 Dafermos & Nikolaidi, 2020.




The research we have presented in this report should make one thing abundantly
clear: anyone who seeks to address biodiversity mass extinction and its political-
economic causes and consequences solely, or even primarily, as a funding problem
will fail on their own terms and on broader moral registers. What we call “gap
mentality” suggests that we can solve biodiversity loss by throwing money into a
pit until it is full, creating a bridge to the desired outcomes. While more resources
are undoubtedly required to realise CBD objectives, reducing the scale and scope
of the problem to one of funding will, at best, tinker at the edges of the crisis. Gap
talk may be rhetorically powerful to demonstrate one (key) challenge we face in
maintaining global biodiversity, but the gap tells us very little about what, or who,
caused the gap in the first place, what is making the gap deeper, what the social
and environmental impact of conservation finance is on the ground, and if the
proposed mechanisms are actually closing the monetary gap. Furthermore,
overemphasis of the gap often obscures the actual work we need to do to confront
the current ecological crisis and prevent it from getting worse. Filling a pit with
money on unstable, deeply inequitable ground is not a reliable path to transformative
change.
We demonstrate the limits of this “gap mentality” through two distinct but
interlocking threads. First, the ideology and rules that govern the global economy
are poorly suited to confronting environmental issues as a whole, and biodiversity
loss in particular. The global economy is driven by an insatiable need for growth,
and politics are largely framed by that need. This leads to all manner of policy choices
that fuel biodiversity loss, from the debt/austerity nexus to the continued
subsidisation of extractive industries that directly and indirectly harm biodiversity.
Second, we have explored contemporary mechanisms for channelling resources to
biodiversity conservation or restoration and found them wanting. These mechanisms
largely cleave to extant modalities of global governance that fetishise markets, and
reinscribe the dominance and decision-making monopoly of powerful states and
non-state institutions like banks, business and industry non-governmental
organisations (BINGOs), and supranationals.
If the gap mentality continues to dominate debates over resources and finance,
we are likely to see the continuation of biodiversity loss. Governments around the
world actively subsidise extractive industries and encourage extractivism through
trade deals. International debt relations and austerity impede government action
and furthermore push developing countries to double down on extractivism.
Continuing down this path only leads to further biodiversity loss and will continue
to pose immediate threats to indigenous communities, women and the most
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disenfranchised while benefiting the most wealthy and secure communities.
Additionally, while austerity, trade deals, neo-colonial debt relations and extractivism
are certainly driving biodiversity loss, we also need to acknowledge the tremendous
human suffering that has historically accompanied these policies and continues to
do so.
Amidst these unsustainable and unjust global political and economic patterns,
a series of market-based and voluntary measures are presented as potential
solutions. While the social implications of such approaches vary, there are clear
examples of how market-based approaches have led to ongoing dispossession of
local and indigenous communities. Market-based approaches have not delivered
environmental or economic outcomes at scale and require strong state institutions
or “blended finance” to get off the ground in the first place. Many market-based
approaches themselves remain economically marginal, and we might add that, at
best, they are marginal in a second sense: they only marginally slow down the ecocide
we are facing, and do not fundamentally put us on a more sustainable path. Pursuing
market-based biodiversity governance rather than addressing the extractive world
economy as a driver of biodiversity loss is best understood as a form of extinction
delayism, which postpones substantial action for another year, another decade.
It is apparent that we must move “beyond the gap”, and beyond market-based
and voluntary efforts, in our strategies for addressing biodiversity loss in order to
ensure that the pattern of deferred action does not repeat itself. To start, there is
an emerging evidence-based consensus pushing for strong state and multilateral
action to regulate and redirect those flows of biodiversity and community-degrading
finance, and a reasserted emphasis on shoring up public and multilateral institutions
capable of rectifying past and present global inequalities. Only by placing biodiversity
loss in the global economy will it be possible to realise the post-2020 Global
Biodiversity Framework’s call for “transformative, inclusive and equitable change
across economies and society”.385
Drawing from the analysis undertaken, below we provide a series of specific
recommendations directed to policymakers at the CBD and their home governments.
We organise these recommendations under four primary headings: reforming the
debt/austerity nexus that characterises the organisation of the global economy;
holding the institutional actors responsible for biodiversity loss to account; acting
on inequality across and within countries that impede action on the drivers of
biodiversity loss; and fostering broader social transformations that create a more
sustainable world for all its human and non-human inhabitants. While these
recommendations push at the bounds of what has previously been considered
politically realistic, they are proportionate to the scope of the problems and
necessary for moving beyond the gap.
385 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2020.
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Recommendations
1) End the debt-austerity nexus that fuels extractivism and impedes CBD
implementation. To advance the call for transformative change, Parties to the
CBD must:
• Reject austerity/debt-led international and national policies that continue to
cripple advancement of CBD and Sustainable Development Goal (SDG)
objectives as well as pandemic recovery, and instead push for robust North-
South transfers necessary to support global health, climate and biodiversity.386
• Reaffirm and deliver on Article 20 obligations not as aid or charity but as
payment for developed countries’ vast ecological debts.
• Increase Global Environment Facility and other funding to Indigenous and
community initiatives.387
• Push for sovereign debt restructuring in line with CBD objectives and decisions,
including some level of debt cancellation or restructuring that can allow
governments to prioritise investments in quality public services as well as
pandemic recovery that is just and sustainable.388 As part of this effort, CBD
Parties should request the Subsidiary Body on Implementation (SBI) to
undertake a study on the relationship between debt, austerity and CBD
implementation, with a view to removing specific impediments to CBD
implementation.
2) Regulate finance and penalise industries known to damage biodiversity and
the rights of Indigenous peoples and local communities. The language in the
current GBF is weak, and there is a risk that the emphasis will be on voluntary
disclosure and actions well-known to be ineffective. Parties should:
• Eliminate subsidies harming biodiversity and communities, and redirect these
financial resources, along with wasteful military spending, to support
Indigenous, peasant and smallholder stewardship.
• Actively support efforts to develop an international, legally-binding instrument
on business and human rights that incorporates clear liability standards for
corporate violations and abuse of human rights and guarantees victims’ access
to remedy and justice, including restoration and compensation for damage to
biological diversity.389
386 See Kozul-Wright, 2020.
387 See also Forest Peoples Programme, 2020.
388 Ibid. Please note that this recommendation does not endorse debt-for-nature swaps, which we review in
section 2.1.
389 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, n.d.
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• Revise fiduciary duty and associated concepts that govern institutional finance
to require protection of public goods like a safe climate and biological diversity,
and to include commitments to international legal norms and standards like
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)
and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People
Working in Rural Areas (UNDROP).
• Require public pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and central bank policies
to align with CBD objectives and decisions through regulation (not voluntary
measures).
• Ensure trade and investment agreements do not have provisions that negate
or undermine CBD objectives and wider human, Indigenous, and peasant
rights.
• Implement the “polluter pays principle”, including taxes or levies on damaging
activities like international shipping, extractive industries and industrial
agriculture, for example.
• Establish a legal obligation of due diligence including the obligation to consider,
identify and disclose biodiversity risks at every level of the investment chain,
including upon institutional investors and asset managers. This due diligence
obligation should be associated with commensurate sanctions in case of non-
fulfilment.
• Establish rules pertaining to corporate disclosures, including Environmental,
Social and Governance (ESG) risks, in a way that improves the quality,
standardisation and comparability of the non-financial disclosures about key
sustainability risks, including biological diversity.390
3) Ensure biodiversity finance does not impede transformative change nor
undermine CBD objectives, UNDRIP, and UNDROP. The record of voluntary
and market-based mechanisms, including offsets, is disappointing across social,
economic, and environmental criteria, yet they continue to hold prominence
in CBD discussions. Parties should:
• Reject financial and market-based mechanisms that impede or undermine
necessary transformative change, like biodiversity and ecosystem-based
carbon offsets that legitimise business-as-usual extractivism and power
relations.
• Ensure that market-like incentive schemes such as PES, if used, support efforts
to address indirect and large-scale drivers of biodiversity loss, including
inequitable development and resource use, and respect the rights of
Indigenous peoples and local communities.
390 See Johnston et al., 2019.
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• Ensure that biodiversity financing advances all three objectives of the CBD
and does not undermine decisions taken to advance and secure the rights of
Indigenous peoples, peasants, women, and local communities.
• Strengthen safeguards for all flows of biodiversity finance – including private
and public – to ensure the free, prior and informed consent of all rights-holders
and other stakeholders.391
• Reject blended finance and public-private partnerships that continue to
socialise losses and privatise gains, and instead implement strong regulatory
approaches as outlined above (under point 2) that will more effectively shift
capital flows away from degrading activities.
4) Reduce domestic and international wealth and power inequalities that impede
transformational change. Wealth inequalities concentrate power, and this
power makes the necessary transformational policy change difficult. Parties
should:
• Enact effective safeguards for environmental and land defenders.392
• Support the development of a UN Tax Convention to address tax havens and
tax abuse by multinational corporations and other illicit financial flows through
a universal and intergovernmental process.393
• Implement progressive tax measures, including but not limited to international
and national wealth taxes, and raising tax rates of global banks and large firms,
to increase funding available for CBD implementation, to support a just
recovery from the pandemic, and to redress the social and environmental
impacts of inequality.
• Support antitrust measures that break up the power of big finance and
corporations which hold disproportionate influence on policymaking.
5) Act on dismantling class, caste, racial and gender inequalities that underpin
biodiversity loss and impede conservation and sustainable use. Parties should:
• Recognise the role that racial, gender, caste and wealth inequalities play as
drivers of biodiversity loss and as impediments to the three objectives of the
CBD.394
391 See also recommendation in Forest Peoples Programme, 2020, p. 29.
392 Ibid., p. 13.
393 See United Nations Intergovernmental Tax Commission, n.d.
394 See, for example, Tendayi Achiume, 2019.
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• Establish an expert group, to report to SBI 4, to further study the relationship
between racial, gender, caste and wealth inequalities and CBD objectives/
decisions.
• Focus resource mobilisation – including the GEF resources – on supporting
ongoing stewardship and legal/political orders of Indigenous peoples and
smallholder fishers/farmers who are enacting conservation and sustainable




In this appendix we try to approximate carry-over in the GEF biodiversity focal area
rather than the carry-over for entire GEF replenishments, which can be found in
section 1.2 of this report. It is important to emphasise that this is our best way of
heuristically illustrating the carry-over in this specific focal area based on publicly
available data from the GEF, but we are unable to guarantee that this methodology
can accurately show exact carry-over from the biodiversity focal area relative to
other focal areas. The preliminary results of this investigation can be found in Figure
9 below. However, we urge the reader to approach these numbers with care since
assessing exactly how carry-over is represented in different GEF focal areas would
require further accounting research.
Figure 9 is based on two data sources in order to give an estimation of actual
GEF biodiversity spending during individual replenishments in relation to targeted
spending on biodiversity that appear in GEF Summary of Negotiations documents
for individual replenishments. Firstly, the bars in the figure show estimations of
actual spending in the biodiversity focal area during individual replenishments. These
bars are aggregations of GEF project spending from the publicly available GEF Project
Management Information System as of 14 December 2020.395 The blue parts of the
bars represent GEF financing for projects that are purely part of the GEF biodiversity
focal area whereas the red parts of the bars are multifocal area projects that include
a biodiversity component. However, it has not been possible for us to disaggregate
multifocal area project funding, which would otherwise have allowed us to determine
how much funding for multifocal area projects comes from the biodiversity focal
area specifically. As should be clear from the figure, we do not include PMIS data
for GEF-6 and GEF-7.
In order to construct the bars in Figure 9, we searched the publicly available
GEF PMIS for the term “biodiversity”. All cancelled projects were excluded. Projects
were included irrespective of their fund source. Furthermore, to make sure that we
did not underestimate spending for the biodiversity portfolio, we included a few
projects that may not strictly be part of the biodiversity portfolio: Projects that
were not categorised as biodiversity in the GEF PMIS and had no explicit mention
of focal area, but had biodiversity in their title, were categorised as biodiversity by
the researchers. Projects that were not categorised as biodiversity in the GEF PMIS
and explicitly mentioned another focal area, but had biodiversity in their title, were
categorised as multifocal area by the researchers.
395 https://www.thegef.org/projects.
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The second kind of data that we have included in the graph is targeted focal
area allocation and focal area breakdowns as they appear in Summary of
Negotiations documents for individual replenishments.396 These documents do
emphasise that there might be various reasons why actual spending does not align
with breakdowns. Even though it should be relatively straightforward to include
these numbers, we do need to add a caveat: Of the numbers included in the figure,
only the total of targeted numbers for GEF-3 and GEF-6 balances with the figures
on historically pledged amounts that we included in section 1.2. The sum of all the
different targeted allocations of GEF-4 and GEF-5 is lower than the historically
pledged amounts that we present in section 1.2. Yet, these programming
breakdowns also include focal area programming as a share of total programming.
If we had calculated targeted biodiversity spending as a percentage of historically
pledged amounts, we would have achieved higher numbers for targeted biodiversity
allocation/programming.
Figure 9: Spending on biodiversity versus biodiversity programming targets
at the GEF
Black line represents targeted allocation for the biodiversity focal area according to breakdowns in
Summary of Negotiations documents. The blue bars are GEF spending on projects in the biodiversity
focal area. The red bars are GEF spending on multifocal area projects with biodiversity components.
Both sets of bars are based on our own calculations of publicly available data from the GEF PMIS as
this data appeared on 14 December 2020.
396 These numbers are based on official ex ante programming numbers as they appear in summaries of GEF
negotiations and thus differ from actual spending. See: Global Environment Facility, 2002, p. 14; Global
Environment Facility, 2006, p. 15; Global Environment Facility, 2018a, p. 160.
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397 There has been a trend towards multifocal area projects (which include biodiversity-related components) to
become a larger share of the overall GEF biodiversity portfolio. See also Global Environment Facility
Independent Evaluation Office, 2019, p. 9.
As is evident from the stacked bars above, the combined spending for the
biodiversity focal area and multifocal area investments, which contain a biodiversity
component, did not fulfil the programming figures as they appear in summaries of
negotiations in nominal terms for GEF-3 and GEF-4. From GEF-5 this changes: While
the spending for projects that solely focus on biodiversity declines according to
data from the GEF PMIS, spending for biodiversity projects and multifocal area
projects with a biodiversity component fulfils the original programmed spending
during replenishment negotiations if we assume that more than half of funding for
multifocal area projects with a biodiversity component is actually spent on
biodiversity.397 However, without evaluating the actual spending on multifocal area
projects coming from the biodiversity focal area, it is difficult to assess how much
the carry-over from the biodiversity focal area is for every replenishment. It is
important to once again emphasise that the graph is our best way of trying to
illustrate potential carry-over in the biodiversity focal area through a discrepancy
between spending/programming targets and spending on biodiversity according
to the publicly available data in the GEF PMIS, but that much more thorough
accounting research may be needed.
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